58.设计战略能否成为新的竞争银弹

 

本期主持：金错刀 《数字商业时代》主笔
本期嘉宾：Andy Swiky IDEO大中华区执行总裁 姚映佳 联想集团工业设计中心总经理

 

金错刀: 当设计成为一种战略，你要该如何准备？
　　在惊悚故事里，人们坚信只有用银弹（银质子弹）才能消灭人狼。在商业故事里，“银弹”则是那些能够迅速解决问题的捷径之道。不可否认，越来越多的人开始拥抱设计战略，并力图使设计战略成为公司新的竞争“银弹”。

　　不可否认，这枚“银弹”曾经使不少陷入泥沼的公司反败为胜。看看索尼爱立信的例子吧，在众多手机里，索爱手机的设计已经成为一种符号。索爱对设计的重视，可以从其组织架构设置中看出一二。索爱以前的设计中心只归研发部门。索爱成立之后，公司高层认为工业设计如此重要，是实现与众不同的重要策略，所以把设计中心直接归总裁管理，设计的任何一个产品都要给总裁看。

　　另一个案例是摩托罗拉，这家公司正在从一家技术导向公司变为一家设计先行的公司，而V3正成为改变这家大象公司的革命性产品，在推出银色、黑色、靓粉几款V3后，摩托罗拉正在继续推出V3超薄系列，把这一设计战略发挥到了极至。

　　越来越多的案例表明，在新的竞争环境下，优秀的设计不仅设计产品，更营造体验，最为关键的是，设计正在改变公司的战略。
　　
在几天前举办的“国际领先设计与中国新兴市场”论坛上，商业与设计再次成为热门话题。但是，设计这一新的竞争利器，却并非每一个公司都能驾驭，真正带来商业成功的设计战略只是少数。商业与设计如何完美融合？当设计成为一种战略，你要该如何准备？

 

Andy Swiky:设计思维：第一部分是人；第二部分是生意、技术；第三部分是欲望、可行性等等
　　设计思维到底是什么样的内容。每个人都提到有关的创新问题，IDEO强调的就是创新的过程，这种设计的思维是一种达成设计成果的过程，我们希望把它分成三个部分：第一部分是人；第二部分是生意、技术；第三部分是欲望、可行性等等。这种设计思维我们更多的考虑是人的方面的问题，像任何系统一样，一个比较有意思的事情是在这些圆圈之间发生的事情，包括你的欲望、你可行性等等之间的事情，作为人来说，你要理解其他人喜欢什么，其他人为什么付钱。比如我来自硅谷，在硅谷每天有很多高技术产品，在这些高技术产生之间有很多有趣的事情。你可以将这些非常有利的概念合并起来，他们一般是人和技术之间的关系，要了解人和生意之间的关系是很有意思的，人的感情，还有品牌的建立，和技术之间的关系，也就是技术和生意之间、业务战略之间的关系。

　　我要强调以人为本，要考虑对人的关爱。我想谈一下对人的关爱问题，要理解人的需要，新的技术并不是全部，德鲁克在几周前去世了，他以前提到过这个问题。我们是如何做的呢？首先是一个观察人的生活的过程，并不是说只是跟人们交流，而是要看人们的生活是什么样的。我们到圣路易斯一个医院的急救室，我们把一个摄像机绑到一个病人的头上，这样就可以看到一个病人的感受。这是一个很简单的事情，但是它能使我们从其他人的角度看这个问题，这是一个很有利的概念，从中能够产生对人的关爱。我们谈到的很多事情是与产品的设计有关的。我们的设计也别不只是围绕一种形式，而是要观察形式之后的东西，我们IDEO做了很多解决方案，是有关人们在文化中的角色、在社会中的角色的，所以我们解决的方案是比较复杂的。

姚映佳:我想谈到两个很有意思的词，中文来讲发音是一样的，叫立意和利益
　　关于设计和商业的成功。我想谈到两个很有意思的词，中文来讲发音是一样的，叫立意和利益。所谓的立意就是对设计来讲，你的出发点和思考点在哪里。而利益商业获得成功，总是需要企业经营的目标，由企业达到市场经营的计划。我们认为一个好的设计和商业成功的链接必须将立意和利益有效的思考联系在一起。
在1999年的时候，开发的时候我们有一个产品叫Internet PC，中国正面临着因特网普及的阶段，很多中国人不知道Internet是一个什么样的状况，很多人对鼠标都不是很熟悉。这种情况下，我们想从设计本身来考虑，怎么样让中国的客户进入Internet更加简单，同时Internet又是产业发展的趋势，这时候我们要考虑到用户的利益和企业发展的利益相关的事情。这时候我们设计了一个热键，它的概念是我们怎么样让用户更好的使用PC，在PC上查到Internet的网站。因为那时候你用Internet你要输入很多的密码和验证，所以我们做了很多的东西，那时候我们觉得老式收音机对人们来讲是非常简单的，后来我们就设计了热键在键盘上，用户可以旋转它，很容易的一键进入Internet的功能，我们通过硬件的产品和服务的捆绑，带给用户很好的商业体验。

　　对于联想来讲，创新和商业设计成功是一个紧密相连的关系，一个企业如果让三者之间达到最大的价值化的话，必须使企业活动的体系变得成功和有方向。所以企业创新的活动、品牌的活动、成本的活动应该是紧密相连的关系，你只有让这些活动变得非常的紧密，最终才能有效的平衡，就是成本和差异性的关系。对于企业来讲，一谈到差异性就意味着高昂的成本，一谈到成本就意味着差异性的消失。其实对于一个真正愿意了解和愿意去做真正创新工作的组织来讲，这两者之间是可以达到平衡的，这两者之间真正达到平衡的话，对于你这个行业和企业来讲是一个新的蓝海。

　　对于设计商业来讲，有很多的价值，通过概念的设计，通过设计一个前瞻性的视角，你可以用这些结果测试市场的反馈和用户的反馈，这里有一个笔记本的概念，可以让用户有不同的使用模式，我们把硬件和软件结合在一起，这个设计概念来自中国每一代的书法，不同朝代的书法有不同的分割，这到2008年，可以让外国人更好的体会中国的文化。这是从硬件和软件考虑的问题。　　

 

 

当一种思想在首次公之于众后，仍然会长期存在、发展并持续影响企业，这必定是风靡一时的管理思潮的对立面。难怪11月11日逝世、享年95岁的彼得•德鲁克(Peter Drucker)，反对给自己贴上“大师”标签，因为这让人想到狂热和江湖骗术。数十年来，德鲁克的观点一直在启示着经理人和企业领袖。

德鲁克于1909年出生于奥地利，他接受了传统的上流教育，要不是因为希特勒，他通常会进入职业领域或学术领域。1937年，他离开欧洲前往美国，一开始做了记者，然后投入了他的毕生事业——管理学写作。

在此后的70年里，他写了30多本管理学著作，甚至在他辞世时，还有一部著作未完成。

“如果你问我，德鲁克的观点流传得如何，”《长寿公司》(The Living Company)一书的作者阿里•德赫斯(Arie de Geus)说，“坦白说，我一直认为他非常超前，因此真正的问题是，我们要花多久才能赶上他的思想。”

对德赫斯先生而言，德鲁克无疑就是奥地利人，尽管他大部分时光是在美国度过的。“他对创新的强调可以追溯到很早以前，实际上可以追溯到熊彼特(Schumpeter，最早提出了资本主义‘创造性毁灭’的概念)。”

创新的话题直接导致了德鲁克的一些最著名的见解。“创新组织不会花费时间或资源去捍卫昨天，”他写道，“光是系统性地放弃昨天就能够释放资源，尤其是其中最稀缺的资源——人才……”

60多年来，人一直是德鲁克关注的焦点。(他拒绝从事经济学研究，因为他认为经济学缺少对人这方面的兴趣。)德鲁克认为，管理学在本质上是一项社会职能。

根据德鲁克以人为本的做法，可以将其影响归为四类。

知识工人

德鲁克批评集中、非人性的制度，这种制度可以追溯到F•W•泰勒(F.W. Taylor)的“科学管理”理论。德鲁克设想了一种新式工作，它更多依靠员工的才智贡献，而较少依靠他们基本的体力。

虽然德鲁克较早的很多著作认为，将员工视为资源而不仅是成本，员工才能做出有价值的贡献，但直到1969年，他的《不连续的时代》(The Age of Discontinuity)出版，他才明确谈到了“知识工人”这个他自创的短语。

“虽然知识工人不是劳工，当然也不是无产阶级，但他也不是需要听指令的下属，相反，他运用自己的知识、判断，承担领导责任，并因此得到报酬，”德鲁克写道。

德鲁克等了近30年，直到狂热的“新经济”时代到来，知识工人一词才广为人们接受。但他对现代雇员的描绘——更多地使用脑力而非体力，现在已是常理。

“这个短语成了俗语，多数企业也许不再用它了，”伦敦商学院管理学实践教授琳达•格拉顿(Lynda Gratton)说，“他转变了企业的焦点，并让企业明白，价值不是来自商品而是来自知识资本。知识工人的概念仍然存在，即使人们现在有了更具体的职位头衔，来描述他们的工作。”

《21世纪的管理挑战》(Management Challenges for the 21st Century)是德鲁克最后的几本著作之一，他在书中回到了这样一个主题：“20世纪的公司，最有价值的资产是生产设备。而在21世纪，无论商业机构还是非商业机构，最有价值的资产将是知识工人和他们的劳动生产率，”他写道。

公司的概念

尽管德鲁克崇拜伟大的企业，但他仍然认为，这些企业的继承结构通常都过于集中和僵化。这不利于知识工人发挥他们的才干与能力。必须挑战效率低下的等级制度。这种观点影响了通用电气(GE)50年代的重组，但它的灵感出现得更早。

40年代时，德鲁克用了两年时间，研究艾尔弗雷德•P•斯隆(Alfred P. Sloan)所执掌的通用汽车(GM)的结构，写下了《公司的概念》(The Concept of the Corporation，1945年)。在该书中，他预见了更扁平的网络化组织的崛起，还批评了这个汽车巨头低效的传送带心态。

斯隆无动于衷，但德鲁克的思想太超前于他们的时代了。德鲁克后来声称，当时通用汽车任何经理人看他的书都会被解雇。

“确实是德鲁克开始了有关同事群体，以及如何在组织里共享知识与信息的全部探讨，”格拉顿教授说，“如果看看英国石油(BP)在‘同事协助’(peer assist)项目上的工作；或者在这方面做得很棒的诺基亚(Nokia)，德鲁克的原著里都有讨论。”

目标管理

德鲁克主张，在企业的各个层次，如果不严格地坚持追求短期和长期目标，管理将迷失方向。这个简单论断的影响十分巨大。

本月，通用电气前首席执行官杰克•韦尔奇(Jack Welch)在接受《洛杉矶时报》(Los Angeles Times)采访时，讲述了与德鲁克的一次简短对话，这次对话致使他重新思考通用电气的战略方案。“德鲁克说，‘如果你现在没有加入这家公司，你今天会加入吗？如果不会，你会怎么处理？’简单，对吧？却无比有力。”

在1954年出版的著作《管理实践》(The Practice of Management)中，德鲁克首次论述了“目标管理”。这一短语随后流传开来。在他的所有理念中，“目标管理”或许是影响最大的一个。那些参加策划会议的人，又有谁没有见过(空白)页面顶部，用大字母写下“目标”一词的翻页挂图的呢？

几乎到处都采纳了“目标管理”，也许正因为如此，这也是德鲁克被误解最深的管理概念。“这个概念已完全植根于每个组织中，”格拉顿教授表示，“尽管目前它或许更多是受数据驱使，这并非德鲁克当初想看到的。”

对目标管理的批评已有多年。1970年，美国心理学家哈里•莱文森(Harry Levinson)，在《哈佛商业评论》上发表名为《目标管理，从谁的目标着手？》(Management by Whose Objectives?)一文，他在文中认为，目标管理没有考虑员工的动机。

领导力咨询公司Levinson Institute由哈里•莱文森于35年前创立，其首席执行官盖里•克莱恩斯(Gerry Kraines)赞同这位创始人的部分反对意见。他尤其担心目标与奖励之间的联系。

“如果经理人将薪酬与员工是否达标联系起来，并试图以此引导员工的工作，就会产生对立关系，”他说道，“坚持将回报最小化的做法符合员工的利益。那种做法催生贪婪，鼓励员工与制度进行‘博奕’。”

克莱恩斯博士认为，通用电气就是很好的榜样，通用电气一开始采纳了目标管理，但之后成功地改造了它。“‘中子杰克’就是对目标管理的字面回应——要么在市场上数一数二，要么就退出，但当杰克•韦尔奇开始关注员工如何增加价值超越目标时，”他说，“他们就不再是《蝇王》(Lord of the Flies)式的相互倾轧组织了，他们最大限度利用了目标管理。”

“德鲁克让我感到非常矛盾，他故事说得很棒，他写的东西，80%仍然有用，”克莱恩斯博士表示，“他是最重要的管理学作家，他具有逻辑性，但逻辑性却不太强。”

创造顾客

《管理实践》一书中还包含了德鲁克的这句名言：“商业目的只有一个合理的定义：创造顾客。市场不是上帝、大自然或经济力量创造的，而是商人创造的。在商人找到方法满足顾客的需求前，顾客可能已经产生了需求……但之前这只是理论上的需求，只有商人通过行动创造了有效需求，才有顾客，才有市场。”

“关于这一点，他的意思不是‘告诉顾客做什么’，”麻省理工学院斯隆商学院高级讲师芭芭拉•邦德(Barbara Bund)表示，“我经常引用德鲁克的另一句话：‘企业拿了钱不是用来改造顾客的，而是用来满足顾客需求的’。”

“你做的每件事，都应该有明确的顾客因素，”邦德博士表示，“对顾客了解得再多也不为过，顾客善变，很难对付。但你必须坚持不懈地了解顾客，改进你的“顾客图”，而且要在内部传达。

她举了一个例子：“特易购(Tesco，英国超市集团)在这方面就做得非常出色，它做什么都先想着顾客，这是一条纪律，也是德鲁克20年前谈到的东西。”

译者/张征

 

   “虽然中国整个彩电行业的产量大，但总体利润没有索尼一家多。原因何在？”六西格玛管理专家、普罗维智公司总裁戈泽宁博士认为其中最根本的原因是索尼能在第一时间把事情做正确，不需要返工。这也就是为什么在二三级城市你只能见到国产厂商的维修中心而唯独见不到索尼专修的原因。国产厂商宁可把钱花在售后服务上，也不愿把同样的钱花在产生问题的根本原因上。

　　同样的行业，对于中国企业是微利，对于索尼就不是。因此没有微利时代，只有微利企业。微利必然是提高企业管理水平的一个动力。

 

流程是什么？

 

　　戈泽宁认为中国企业普遍存在质量不过关、对供应链流程缺乏概念等内部管理问题。因此在制造、供应链管理领域提高执行力，也许能找到企业丢失的利润。

　　戈泽宁总在提醒中国的企业：“你们的迅速成长大多是因为国家的宏观经济拉动，而不是内部管理有多么先进。”以手机市场为例，最初国外品牌还未进入中国，国产手机凭借价格低，在二三级市场不计成本铺货，销售增长很快。但当摩托罗拉、三星、诺基亚也推出低价手机，国产厂商的好日子就结束了。戈泽宁曾经为一家国产手机厂商做咨询，该厂商几乎三分之一的手机都要返修，且不说客户的满意度如何，高昂的返修成本已经让厂商备受打击了。假设厂商的年产量为１０００万部，返修一部手机要１００元，那么返修费用会达到３亿元。如果通过质量管理把返修率降到十分之一，那么节约的两亿元就相当于厂商的利润增加了两亿元。

　　在供应链流程领域，有些企业甚至不知道什么是流程。比如完成订单这件事从头做到尾没有人能说清楚它的完整流程是什么，相关数据也没有被完整地记载下来，所以管理的随意性相当大。戈泽宁很无奈地说：“中国企业大多是先做事情，再来思考事情是怎么做出来的。而美国公司在做一件事情前先要把方法想好，把流程文档化、固定化。比如哪些是标准文档，哪些是规范的作业流程，有什么考核指标，先把一切设计好，再来做事。因此我做的持续流程改进项目一般要分两个阶段，第一阶段是梳理全公司所有业务流程，比如一个订单何时到公司，中间经过哪些部门，需要多长时间？这是第二阶段改善流程的基础。”

 

中国企业与GE的差距

 

　　戈泽宁博士曾供职于美国通用电气总部（ＧＥ）策略小组。该小组由１５位顶尖的咨询师组成，为ＧＥ提供一些管理方面的基础性思考，而非就事论事地处理公司日常事务。戈泽宁给记者讲述了他在ＧＥ的一个研究课题，希望中国企业能从中体会国际一流企业的管理积累。

　　１９９６年策略小组接到一个研究课题：互联网对ＧＥ的影响。当时小组首先要思考的是ＧＥ要不要介入互联网；随后小组列出了所有受到互联网威胁的业务清单；最后上交给韦尔奇一份完整的公司战略计划和方法论，包括公司短期、中期、长期不同的战略调整和实施。因此当微软的市值第一次超过通用电气，所有的报道都认为是ＧＥ时代结束的时候，ＧＥ并不着急，因为从１９９６年ＧＥ就开始研究互联网，１９９９年已经正式把电子商务提到公司的战略层面，一切尽在掌握。果然，到２００１年ＧＥ就被美国《ＣＩＯ》杂志评为全美最著名的互联网企业。

　　ＧＥ用事实回应了互联网时代的到来。可以想象正是因为ＧＥ不断的基础性研究、思考公司长期的战略发展，思考如何在根本上提高公司运行效率，不断追求卓越，通用电气才能成为唯一自道琼斯指数创建以来即是成分股的企业。

　　管理的积累让ＧＥ永远在学习、创新，六西格玛管理、卓越运营在ＧＥ这样的公司永远是一个过程，而不是目的或口号。

　　“中国企业为什么执行力不强，并不是中国企业不想去执行，而是不知道怎么去执行。我发现中国的企业普遍没有方法论，做事情靠拍脑袋或某个人的理解，这个人离开公司，换了一个人又用另一种方法，严重缺乏管理的连贯性，没有管理积累。”戈泽宁说。

 

 

拿什么拯救利润

 

　　微利时代，人们首先关注的是企业的成本。

　　“原来预计这一时期在２０１５年到来，现在根据各方面的统计、观察，这一时期的到来足足提前了１０年。”清华大学中国经济研究中心副主任魏杰所谓的“这一时期”是指企业已经到达高成本时期。

 

中国企业已经进入高成本时期？

 

　　“首先是能源：中国经济发展，尤其在推动工业化、城镇化、扩大中产阶级所占比例过程中，引发了能源需求的急剧上升，从而导致了能源价格的提升。而能源是企业生产普遍使用的要素，这样企业成本也就被普遍带高。”在分析高成本时期提早到来的成因时，魏杰说：“第二是原材料，近年来，中国对原材料的需求也处于持续上升阶段，导致原材料价格上升，进而导致生产价格／生产成本上升。”

　　第三是交通运输方面的原因：在现代社会对交通运输需求增加情况下，政府却无力出资，导致商家在运作过程中成本不断增加，而且这种成本增加在日后还有加快加大的趋势，已经波及到多个产业生产成本的上升。

　　第四是在生产条件方面，魏杰分析说：“首先是作为基本生产条件的土地，自去年开始其价格一直在持续上升；其次，来自环保方面的标准越来越严格，导致企业在环保方面的投入不断增加。一个例证是，从２００６年１月１日起，４３项欧洲标准对我国相关出口企业生效，这些企业都需要按照该标准的要求进行环保规划，成本势必大幅增加。

　　第五是人力资源成本上升，首先是由于农业政策调整，农民的非农业收入上升，仅去年一年农民就获得了１０００个亿的好处，而明年的计划是对农民返补５０００亿元，这就势必会抬高农民工的价格（蓝领收入有上升趋势）。其次，为解决公平问题，“利率”导向的调整，以及最低工资限制、最低社会保障限制的提高，都会使人力资源成本上升。

　　最后就是国际方面的原因，由于人民币升值、反倾销导致的生产成本上升。而装备工业的任何调整都会导致成本上升。（一家生产企业每５年引进一条生产线，而新生产线的价格与其过去５年的盈利正好持平。）

　　由此，有专家判断说，中国高成本时代过早到来，２００５年呈缓慢趋势，２００６年会加速。

 

企业如何应对高成本时代的问题

 

　　携程网与首都旅游集团联合投资的经济型连锁酒店如家在短时间内就跻身“中国饭店集团十大影响力品牌”，平均入住率高达９０％以上。

　　如家并没有特别在意宾馆的地段，也不十分讲究房型和整体建筑的结构，更没有华丽的服务设施和餐饮一条龙服务。如家针对的就是那些已经厌倦了星级酒店繁琐而用处不大的服务设施，期望简洁高效的服务模式的商旅客户。

　　北京圣淘沙发现，多数人用餐并不是为了美味，而是为了沟通。所以按照家居客厅的风格设计了单间。而圣淘沙所营造的沟通环境是燕翅鲍大餐所无法比拟的。

　　列举出这样的例子，参加本届企业竞争力年会，并主持了“如何获取微利时代的利润”论坛的ＩＢＭ中国业务咨询部、运营战略首席顾问白立新是为了说明，在这样一个微利时代我们必须创新，只有创新才有出路。他说：“这里的所谓创新要广义地理解，不能从狭义角度定义创新。其实创新对于一个企业而言，除了技术的创新之外还有商业模式的创新。不同产业创新的方式非常不一样。在技术发展初期，假如通过技术突破可以获得技术的领先，但是对于技术成熟的产业更重要的是商业模式、营销模式的创新。”

　　“就如同苹果获奖的原因是因为出色的产品设计和客户体验一样，榜上的每个公司也都可以找出来各自获奖的秘笈”白立新进而对这些公司的创新途径进行了分类和归纳：“这些创新途径总结起来可以分为三大类：第一类是产品创新，包括了我们狭义所说的技术创新；第二类是企业创新；第三类是客户创新。”

　　当然，对于创新，专家的看法也是不一。魏杰认为，“能带来新价值的任何技术变革都是技术创新，如果我们在核心技术方面一时难有突破，非核心技术的创新也能带来许多价值。”

 

不在微利中爆发就在微利中死亡

 

　　毋庸置疑，企业的根本目的就是为了追求利润，而在微利时代，利润决定着企业的生死存亡。但是，“面对着这种状况，恰恰吸引企业家的并不是利润本身，而是创造利润的惊心动魄的过程。”白立新说。

　　在这个过程中，一些专家给出的趋势是：高成本时期会对长期处于大量成本需求状态的企业带来诸多的挑战，导致这些企业出现大规模分化，甚至部分企业走向衰落。

　　那么，中国企业如何通过“创新”突破“微利”的掣肘呢？

　　“跨越产业边界、跨越细分市场、跨越买方边界、从产品到方案、跨越功能体验、追随环境变化。这六大战略将给企业带来颠覆性创新。”白立新谈论到：“不过，对于中国企业来说，在实现跨越，从产业裂缝中寻找利润的过程中，还面临着有悖世界管理趋势的情况，比如说，产业之间沟通成本高，很难形成协作机制，所以为了提高供应链的效率，往往是企业自己投资整个供应链的各个环节。当然，我们认为这种现象仅仅是一种过渡性的解决方案。”

　　对此，魏杰的观点是，一定要解决好技术创新的组织方式。他说：“在美国，把从事技术创新的组织称作‘实验室经济’，我国往往叫做‘技术创新中心’，但它们同样要满足两大要点：庞大的现代化的实验设备、良好的运转机制包括激励机制。中国在后者方面尤其需要加以注意。”

　　另外，专家认为，还要解决好技术创新的资金来源问题。格兰仕曾经通过“贴牌”来积聚企业创新的资金，耗巨资在美国建立“现代家电研究中心”，终于获得了在微波领域“核心部件”的生产技术，现在格兰仕仅靠小小的“核心部件”的出口就能换得诸多的收入，而且大大节约了成本，是个典型的成功案例。

　　“当然，除了企业自身方面的努力外，大的宏观环境方面也应该有所推动，如国家在资金体系方面对‘技术创新’的放开，鼓励民间放贷、私人基金、产业基金等，进而推动企业界从‘中国制造’走向‘中国创造’。”魏杰说。

 

 主持人：

　　白立新：ＩＢＭ（中国）运营战略首席顾问

　　嘉宾：

　　郁亮：万科企业股份有限公司总经理

　　陈东升：泰康人寿保险股份有限公司董事长

　　刘体斌：四川长虹电器股份有限公司总经理

　　王群：华润雪花啤酒（中国）有限公司董事总经理

 

 

 

技术创新能突破利润困局？

 

　　白立新：今天我们的主题是说微利年景里的向上生长，在展开激烈的讨论前，我想让大家先有一个基本的热身，先提一个简单的问题：你所在的行业是否已处于微利时代？

　　郁亮：要说房地产微利的话，我估计大家都要把板砖扔过来，但是说房地产要进入微利时代我想这个判断是会成立的。

　　陈东升：我是做金融服务业的，更准确地说我们是进入了一个规范合理利润的时代。

　　刘体斌：相比他们两位，家电行业已经体现了微利的理念，如果他们是微利，那我们就是微利的二次方。

　　王群：就啤酒行业来说我们已经进入了微利时代，但是我们并不是从高利润或者是暴利进来的，我们是从整个行业亏损进入到整个行业微利时代的。

　　白立新：我们是不是必须通过技术创新来不断推出新的产品，才能突破我们的微利时代？请嘉宾亮题板支持或反对这个观点。我们看到，现场是２ ∶ ２平，郁总和王总举的是“反对”牌，陈总和刘总举的是“支持”牌，我很难判断谁对谁错，还是请各位对你们的选择做出解释吧。

　　郁亮：对房地产行业来说，如果说技术创新很重要，还不如说我们告别粗放更重要。

　　陈东升：金融业里面，我经常举一个例子，信用卡是不是伟大的创新，它是技术发明吗？不是，这是一个创新。由于信用卡的创新，使世界经济扩张了１００年。所以金融技术创新是所有行业必须有的。

　　刘体斌：长虹是家电业，家电业现在是３Ｃ的融合，对这个产业而言，没有技术的创新一天也难生存，技术创新慢了也不行。

　　王群：啤酒行业是一个很古老的行业，最近也没有苗头或者有个别的案例说有技术上的新发展。从狭义的技术创新来说我们行业没有这样的现象，但是广义的技术创新我是同意的。

　　白立新：接下来非常希望听听现场观众对这个问题的态度。如果你同意陈先生和刘先生的观点请举手，大概有四分之一的观众举手。其实不管是支持还是反对，就像刚刚几位嘉宾讨论的一样，我们不能从狭义的角度定义创新。其实创新对于一个企业而言，除了技术的创新之外还有商业模式的创新。现在请现场的朋友谈一下你支持或反对的原因。

　　观众：我原来在制造行业工作了四年，做国际销售，我所在公司是做电子产品的，所以创新对他们非常重要，这也是为什么我支持创新能突破微利时代观点的原因。我觉得从技术角度来讲，对比目前世界上一些大型的、领头的公司，他们为什么能够站在这个行业的前列，很明显的原因就是技术。当其他国家，尤其很多中国企业跟着他们后面跑的时候，他们的利润永远处于很高的阶段，所以中国企业的创新不仅仅是跟人走的过程，我们应该试图站在一个更高的角度上，站在世界前沿的方向去努力，这样我们才能够超越微利年景，走向一个厚利年景，这对中国制造业来讲特别重要。

　　观众：我持的是反对意见。如果仅提技术创新是比较狭义的，更多时候是经营思路的创新。比如内存条大家都知道，这是八九十年代广泛流传的东西，谁也没想到将内存条外化，有一天有一家企业把内存条外化做成了Ｕ盘，这就是技术创新。这就像我们穿的衣服，如果过去把皮袄的毛往里面穿大家都觉得暖和，突然有一天把毛往外穿的时候大家认为这是时尚，这也是一种创新。我认为，在今天这样的时代，很大程度上技术的创新不如说是营销思路的创新。技术创新在ＩＴ领域可能存在，今天的传统产业更多的应该是营销思路的创新。

白立新：总结一下刚刚几位嘉宾的观点以及现场观众的观点，在这样一个微利时代我们必须创新，只有创新才有出路，但对创新我们要广义地理解，不同产业创新的方式非常不一样。在技术发展初期，假如通过技术突破可以获得技术的领先，但是对于技术成熟的产业更重要的是商业模式、营销模式的创新。

 

利润之源在哪里？

 

　　白立新：我们再一次说到利润、模式创新的时候更重要的问题是要思考利润产生的机制。利润到底是从哪儿来的，我们才知道从什么地方创新。我想问在座的嘉宾，你所在的产业最主要的利润来自于什么样的地方？

郁亮：对房地产行业来说，利润有两大块，一块是土地开发，一块是房子的开发。如果说房地产有暴利，这主要集中在第一块，房子本身这一块和制造业差不多。不过，随着宏观调控以来整个市场秩序规范以后，土地开发的利益逐步受到限制，这块的暴利逐步消退，对产品的本质关注更多了。另外我们更像一个服务行业，客户的忠诚度更重要。如何提高客户的忠诚度是我们利润来源最重要的一个手段。万科目前销售的房子里面有一半左右来自于老客户的推荐或者老客户的再购买，也就是口碑，这是我们盈利的最重要来源。

　　陈东升：保险行业是通过控制风险而获得利润的。不断地创新也让我们的利润得到保障。根据客户的需求推出新的产品是保险公司最重要的创新。泰康就抓住中产阶层成长家庭的概念，在首都机场所有的广告里我们提倡“买车买房买保险”，提倡这样的生活方式，我们提倡一张保单保全家。接着是服务创新，我们提出“新生活广场”的概念，根据中产阶层的生活方式、需要的服务、需求的产品来做创新，我们叫做整体创新。我们的商业哲学就是一句话——“为中产阶层服务”，我们的定位非常清楚。

　　白立新：创新是企业最重要的话题，但创新是一件你以前没有做过的事情，怎样尽量减少风险，使你的创新投资更有效率？

　　陈东升：创新就是率先模仿，这是四五年前我的观点，现在我还在坚持。我对“创新就是善于模仿”有三个要义：率先、要找世界最好的、模仿，要满足这三个条件才能在这个行业中处于领先地位。其实现在泰康有了更多的自主创新，因为中国的企业在风险管理、计算机模式或者风险管控方面全方位的模仿是不可能的，我们中国的市场和西方市场不一样，中国未来２０年最大的变化就是拥有一个庞大的中产阶层，这个阶层是所有企业未来要面对的消费群体。不去研究这个社会变化的方向，不抓住这样一个消费发展的方向和脉搏，什么创新都不可能。

　　白立新：陈先生的观点希望大家记住八个字，前面四个字是“率先模仿”，第二是率先模仿基础上形成“自主创新”的能力，针对中国市场、中国社会进步的特点做一些创新。接下来请长虹的刘体斌先生谈谈创新的观点。

　　刘体斌：长虹作为制造业，我认为制造业游戏的三个要素是：企业、产品、客户。这三个主体哪个都可以称之为价值。以企业为主提高效率、低成本运作；以产品为主优化产品结构，创新产品；以客户为主，了解客户的需求和体验。这三种在微利时代都要进行重新规划。现在是微利时代了，我们要超越竞争者，我们基本的策略就是“剩者为王”，只要你能够活下去剩下就为“王”。如果用财务指标来衡量，第一是现金流、第二是销售收入、第三是收入，是这样一个顺序。

　　所以在微利时代我们是从几个方面做，一个方面在商业模式、盈利模式进行调整，我们进行了收缩，就是有所为有所不为。第二是产业多元化。产业多元化一定要做到“形散神不散”，我们现在的“神”就是围绕３Ｃ，纵向一体化，比如电视朝着彩管、空调朝着压缩机这些重要技术发展。第三是横向一体化。

　　王群：我前面一直在想，我没有办法严格按照你提的问题来回答，我想反过来说。比如我们把公司的业务拆开来看，现在还没看到行业里哪一块可以单独拿出来发展会更有竞争力。我们的所有利润都来源于消费者，消费者对于我们形成的品牌概念的认知是方方面面的。我知道的是这个酒喝到客户嘴里是怎么样的，我的分销是不是很有效率，这是我们考虑的问题。对于啤酒行业来说最重要的是一致化的操作。我们公司把它定位在品牌的建设，我们产品的品质、包装、分销、所有的促销活动都和消费者脑子里的印象有关系。所以概括来讲就是通过我们一致性的操作建设我们很好的品牌，对我们来说是最重要的。

　　白立新：其实刚刚和几位嘉宾交流了，今天我们的企业和前几年的盈利状况相比，我们的盈利率是下降了，可是与世界上其他国家所在行业相比，我们的利润水平未必很低，就像现在我们可以维持８％～９％的发展速度，但是世界上很多国家的经济发展速度是１％、２％，所以希望大家利用这个机会共同探讨我们在微利年景里企业所处的环境，希望大家找到创新之路，突破现在利润的困局。

 

 

知识是企业的生命力”这句话在90年代成为普遍共识，它把企业比喻为有生命的活体。这句话假设的前提是：每家企业都必须借助知识才能运转，那些不能管理和创造知识的企业注定要消失。

 

有关组织知识(organisational knowledge)的争论往往针对的课题是：什么是知识？如何对知识进行分类？如何管理知识？还有一批怀疑论者否定“知识管理”(knowledge management)的价值，他们一听到公司任命了“知识经理”就怒火中烧。他们的观点有其道理，因为这些知识经理往往都是美化了的“信息技术经理”，其工作目标是管理系统而非知识本身。不过，我们可以把这些辩论搁置一旁。我们在此关心的问题是：知识是否重要到可以与血液相提并论的地步？将两者相提并论对于管理层来说又意味着什么？

 

观察人士或许怀疑知识管理，但知识本身的重要性不容否认。包括亚当·斯密(Adam Smith)和卡尔·马克思(Karl Marx)在内的经济学家，都曾对知识的重要性做出论述；在19世纪发明计算机并因此闻名的数学家和经济学家查尔斯·巴比奇(Charles Babbage)指出：对知识和科技善加利用，不仅可让企业获利更丰，还可提高工人的生活水平。

 

但直到20世纪80和90年代，人们才清楚地认识到知识在企业中处于核心地位。麻省理工学院(MIT)斯隆管理学院(Sloan School of Management)教授彼得·圣吉(Peter Senge)在1990年所著《第五项修练》(The Fifth Discipline)一书中对 “组织学习循环”(organisational learning cycle)进行了描述。根据圣吉教授的说法，该循环由三部分组成。首先，我们学习新的技术和能力。这样一来，我们就会更加有能力，更加有自信。我们的认知发生了改变，于是就对我们的工作、同事以及客户产生了新的看法。新的认知和知识带来我们在态度和信念上更深层次的变化，我们认识到自己在用新的眼光审视这个世界。基本信念发生了变化，进而就会使学习新技能成为必要，以更加全面地探索那些信念。这个循环就这样周而复始。圣吉教授称，个人和机构都是这样学习的。

 

不过，并非只有创造知识才是重要的。知识必须在企业内进行流通，这样员工才能做好自己的工作。在这里，“生命力”的比喻就显得尤为重要了。阻挡知识的流动好比阻塞动脉。员工如果对企业的其他部分不了解，就会感到孤立，业绩会受挫。美林证券(Merrill Lynch)在2001年9/11袭击后被迫搬出在纽约的办公室，却发现租下的临时办公地点不够所有员工使用，因此有些人只好在家中工作。很快，这些员工开始抱怨他们无法掌握情况。公司便借助电子快讯(E-newsletter)和频繁的电话联系，向在家工作的员工提供他们所需的知识，让他们与公司保持同步。

 

这对于管理层的启示是：一定要让知识不停地流动。但实际上，知识往往无法流动。有些人将知识视为专有资产，只让知识流向那些“应当知道”的人，长此以往便形成管理上的动脉硬化。只有保密要求才能成为企业阻挡知识流动的正当理由。既然知识很重要，员工在不掌握知识的情况下如何尽力而为？

译者/孙谊

 

 

22.中国式管理能催生世界级企业家吗

本期主持：罗建法
本期嘉宾: 邓侠 吴洪刚

 

·            罗建法《东方企业家》主编助理
　　近来，很多地方都搞了一些"孔子缺席的论坛"，论坛上大批企业家对于中国式管理推崇备至。联想到近几年，台湾学者曾仕强的《中国式管理》一书在大陆风行，呼喊中国式管理的声音，更是甚嚣尘上。一时间似乎有水井处便有中国式管理。几千年了，中国人竟然还只有一个孔子，是祖先的光荣还是对不起祖宗？中国式管理真的是中国企业未来的救星吗？对照施振荣，李嘉诚等知名世界的华人企业家，到底是什么因素是造就世界性企业的决定因素？　　

·            邓侠企业战略研究专家
　　中国式管理的本质根植于落后的传统文化

　　在中国企业家身上，我们可以看到很多"中国式"的痕迹，柳传志分槽喂马的接班人方式，也许只有在中国才会出现。

　　从中国式管理的目标看，"和"为管理的终极目标，所谓组织效益目标的实现只是实现"和"这一终极目标的必经过程。孔子把和引入伦理学领域，作为识人的重要标准，得出"君子和而不同，小人同而不和"的论断， 提出了"和为贵"的社会生态平衡的指导原则。社会生态和谐平衡的核心是人际和谐。"仁爱"之心、"忠恕"之道是人际和谐的伦理学基础。上下和谐，管理者与被管理者之间的和谐。集大成者的说法，就是修己安人。

　　我们看看何谓修己，如果仅认为"修已"就是提升个人的修养与能力的话，说明你也算不上一个真正的"中国式管理"者，对中国式管理的精髓根本没有吃透甚至没入门。什么是自古以来的修已标准呢？就是把人修炼成没有自我完整独立人格的，符合社会定位的教化之人。在企业中，说白了，就是服从与听话。我们从小就以"听话"为乘孩子的标准，在企业中也一样。曾国藩算是集"修已"之大成者，但他终究没有以"中体西用"的洋务运动来阻止中国的衰败。"中国式管理"其实在一百多年前已经被《马关条约》划上了句号。

　　我们再来看看"安人".中国式管理倡导"安人"乃是企业管理的最终目的。这种说法似乎有点侮辱中国人的智商。因为，企业是工商文明的产物，其目标是创造价值。而"安人"之道显然是在一个稳定、非竞争农业文明下的管理需求。虽有可借签之处，但其目标是风马牛不相及。企业是在竞争中成长的，其边界随时有被竞争者入侵。以安人为目的的管理的基本前提条件已经不存在，这时以"安人"为目的显然是违背了现代企业的宗旨。更有甚者，"安人"本来就是一种试图将自己的意识加于他人的管理方式，看似温情关怀，实际是让员工人格独立性的丧失，最终让企业创新能力的丧失。是对企业家精神的严重腐蚀。

　　日本人说：你们看，我们就是受了中国传统的儒家文化的熏陶才发展起来的，所以中国的企业应该以"中国式管理"为主。然而这恰恰是日本人睁着眼睛说瞎话，因为日本是"西方七国"之中唯一的亚洲国家。二十世纪九十年代，日本经济大有赶超美国的势头，所以日本也出现一种日本式管理的热潮，和今天中国式管理的背景如出一辙。一个简单的道理就是，日本近百年是被不断注入了西方现代管理思维才成就了第二大经济强国。如果中国企业固守"中国式管理"不放的话，日本人正偷着乐呢！

·            吴洪刚科特勒营销公司副总 　
　　融入现代化主流才能造就世界性企业

　　什么是世界级企业家？不久前，美国小布什总统考虑停止征收遗产税，可是有两人登广告反对，一个是微软的比尔盖茨，一个是巴菲特。他们说："我不能允许我的第二代不劳而获"，这就是世界级企业家。简单的广告的背后是支撑美国近百年发展强大的人文精神。

　　简单的讲，世界级企业家就是能创建世界领先企业的企业家。这个领先，是指首创与第一，而不是第二。是带领全球行业进步的龙头，在他的前面是没有可模仿的现成的技术，现成的模式。按照这个定义，所有以模仿，后发优势的企业，不论其规模如何，都不足以成为世界级的企业。因此，自由思考、创新精神才是世界级企业家的基本功。人格的独立性的管理才是世界级企业的根基。

　　基督教认为：任何人都不能被当成其他目的的工具。但我国传统的管理思想，把人当然实现天下大治的手段，这种不以人为社会进步的目的的管理思维，与现代企业精神是背道而驰的，担当不起培育世界企业的重任。我们看到的是西方企业的强大与先进，但这只是西方从文艺复兴以来几百年思想进步的结果而已。看不到世界先进企业家背后的人性的光辉，想以玩弄人性弱点的"中国式管理"来催生世界企业家，这个玩笑开大了点！

　　有世界级企业家才会有世界级企业。中国一定会出现世界级的企业家，这是不容置疑的，但究竟是谁，这可不好说了，如果非要举例，我想海尔的张瑞敏、华为的任正非算得上半个吧。要较真的话，中国现在能称得上的确实没有。但从长远来看，中国必然会孕育世界级的企业和企业家。要孕育世界级的企业和企业家，必然要突破以下几点：

　　1、管理思维的全球化

　　没有全球化的管理思维和视野，就没有全球化的企业领导人。全球化的思维要求中国企业家睁眼看世界，看清世界管理思想的发展趋势，看清市场经济的人文思想基础。简单的讲，总强调低人工成本的中国企业家是不可能成为世界级的企业家的，为什么呢？因为低人工成本违背了企业的根本目标与现代管理的核心精神。这个核心精神是什么呢？就是人是社会和企业进步的目的，真正有竞争力的企业是尊重个人的企业。从现实来讲，从来没有一家低人工成本企业成为世界级企业的先例。

　　2、市场的全球化

　　要造成世界级的企业，就要求中国的企业的目标市场是全球。既包括落后的未开发的非洲、印度，但更应该包括美国、日本、欧洲。为什么说发达国家的市场很重要呢，因为世界级企业家首先要有的是"逢敌必亮剑"的精神，不能总是避开敌人主力的"游击战"，能否成就世界级的企业，关键是看你在世界主要市场的成败。这要求中国企业家转变思维，不能总是避强就弱，要从全球"游击战"和思维转变为全球"正规战".

　　3、研发的全球化

　　要创新，要造成世界级的企业，就要懂得如何充分利用全球科研人员的的脑袋。在国内，不具备创新条件的，可以放到全球最好研发水平的地方去研发。懂得利用和发挥全球科技人才为企业服务。

　　4、人力资源的全球化

　　世界级的企业，就不能专门强调是中国的企业了，现在很多跨国公司，在当地注册经营，纳税，你说是哪国的企业？同时，没有人力资源的全球化，也没有真正的全球化企业。我们不能强调，一定是中国人领导或者中国式的管理。一个全球化的企业一定是能吸引到全球各路高手前来投奔的企业。象目前好多企业，浙江人一定用浙江人，温洲人一定用温洲人，在国内尚不能全国化，谈何世界级企业家。

　　海尔流行一句话："要想一滴水不干涸，惟一的办法就是把它放到大海里去".同样，我们中国优秀的管理文化和思想，要想发扬光大，唯一的办法就是融入到世界文化与管理思想中去。

　　其实，在中国、中国台湾，已经有一批睁眼看世界的企业家。李嘉诚，施振荣，张忠实谋等知名企业家，都已经驰名于世界，但是，需要说明的是，他们之所以走向世，绝不是什么中国式管理的破玩意，而是因为更多地融合了现代社会的主流，借鉴世界管理的新潮流。我们相信中国一定会出世界级企业和世界级企业家，但这不会是抱残守缺的结果，而是融入世界主流的结果。

 

By Cliff Edwards, Peter Burrows, and Ronald Grover

Daggers Drawn Over DVDs
How Sony gained an edge in its fierce battle with Microsoft over video formats


Every July, 400 of the most powerful media and tech industry chieftains meet at investment banker Herb Allen's conference in Sun Valley, Idaho, for what are usually convivial discussions of megatrends and megamergers. But this year, Microsoft (MSFT ) Chairman Bill Gates III laid into Sony (SNE ) Chief Executive Howard Stringer, according to two sources, including one who witnessed the exchange in a private room.

 

Gates argued that Sony's new high-definition DVD standard, called Blu-ray, needed to be changed so it would work smoothly with personal computers running on Microsoft's Windows operating system. Stringer and two lieutenants defended the technology, insisting Blu-ray would work fine in PCs.

Yet Gates's ire only grew. "There must be something much deeper going on," Stringer said later, according to another person who heard the comment. A Microsoft spokesman acknowledges that Gates and Stringer talked at the conference, but says things did not become "heated."

Gates's efforts to derail Stringer's plans soon became public, though. On Sept. 27, Microsoft and Intel (INTL ) fired a broadside at Sony, suggesting publicly the company's Blu-ray technology couldn't deliver what it promised, and they pledged their support for a rival technology from Toshiba (TOSBF ).

CRITICAL MASS.  The news touched off a torrent of recriminations and finger-pointing. Several movie studios quickly voiced their support for Sony. Two major Chinese DVD makers backed the Toshiba standard, which is called HD DVD. And Dell (DELL ) and Hewlett-Packard (HPQ ) took the highly unusual step of issuing a joint statement denouncing the move by Microsoft and Intel, the PC makers' two most important suppliers. "Desperation" is the way Brian Zucker, a technology strategist at Dell, characterized Microsoft's move.

It may amount to little more than that. Despite the backing of the PC industry's two biggest titans, it looks as if HD DVD's days are numbered.

Sony is lining up strong support among Hollywood studios as well as other consumer-electronics companies. On Oct. 3, Paramount Pictures (VIA ) announced it would end exclusive support of HD DVD and support both standards. Warner Bros. (TWX ) is expected to follow suit in the next few days, sources say (see BW Online, 10/5/05, "A Warner Bros. Green Light for Blu-ray?"). That will give Sony six of the seven major studios. Sony may negotiate a deal to give a slice of Blu-ray royalties to Toshiba, and perhaps even Microsoft, but that would largely be a face-saving compromise. Sony appears to have a critical mass of support for its standard.

BITTER FEUD.  A major factor swaying these companies is Blu-ray's massive capacity. Its disks will hold at least 50 gigabytes and perhaps 100 gigs or more. HD DVD will start at 15 gigs, and top out at 45. "We want a standard that's going to be around for 10 or 15 years," says one studio exec.

Microsoft's criticism is that Blu-ray disks will be more expensive to manufacture and may be impossible to make in large volumes. Yet the technology's supporters are convinced costs will be similar over the long term. "We don't see any big cost difference, and we know a thing or two about volume manufacturing," says Michael Dell, chairman of PC giant Dell.

Why is so much vitriol spilling from behind closed doors over one tech standard? The shiny little disk that Gates and Stringer tangled over has the potential to alter the landscape of the entertainment and technology industries. Next-generation DVDs will feature high-definition movies, extras like movie-themed computer games, and the ability to download film trailers from the Internet.

CONFLICTING VISIONS.  Tech players, media companies, consumer-electronics giants, and retailers are brawling to take advantage of the new financial and strategic opportunities. "It's like the old Irish saying: 'Is this a private fight, or can anyone jump in?'" says Paul Saffo, director of the Institute for the Future.

For each side, the stakes are huge. Movie studios, struggling with a sudden slowdown in the $18 billion-a-year U.S. DVD market, are salivating over the chance to entice consumers with movies on new high-definition disks. Consumer-electronics makers -- which increasingly include Dell and HP -- are banking on people thirsting for more high-definition gear, from DVD players to big-screen TVs. And Microsoft and Intel, hungry for new growth opportunities, want to expand their roles in people's lives, helping them manage digital photos or download the next Batman flick off of the Net.

Behind the brinkmanship lie two vastly different views of where entertainment in the home is heading. Microsoft and Intel paint a futuristic picture of the digital home, with sleek PCs powered by their software and chips in the central role. The PC would shuttle music, photos, and video from room to room—and grab off the Web everything from the latest Tom Cruise blockbuster to a National Public Radio podcast.

TRIPLE PLAY.  Sony and its supporters are skittish about the latest movies being zipped around the house. Blu-ray disks can hold more content than today's DVDs, but they would be used in much the same way. The new disks would be plopped into a DVD player, and copyrighted material, like Hollywood movies, couldn't be ripped to a computer's hard drive without a studio's permission.

Blu-ray equipped devices are even designed to recognize and refuse to play pirated movies. Such protections are another big reason Sony has won the support of studios, such as News Corp.'s Fox (NWS ).

No company has more at stake than Sony. Long one of the most innovative companies in electronics, it stumbled badly in recent years. With Blu-ray, it has the opportunity for a triple play. It'll reap royalties from all the disks sold with its technology. Its movie business could see a resurgence in lucrative DVD sales. And it could see sales soar for its electronics gear, including HDTVs, movie cameras, Blu-ray optical drives, and especially its new PlayStation game consoles, which will include a Blu-ray drive for playing movies.

Sony's people have "bet the entire future on this," says analyst Michael Pachter of Wedbush Morgan Securities. "It's too important for them to lose, so they will do everything they can to win."

HIGH-TECH INTRIGUE.  The story of how Sony and Stringer maneuvered their way into what looks like a winning position in the DVD wars includes enough intrigue to fill more than a few disks. The backdrop is Sony's famous failure two decades ago to establish Betamax as the standard for videotape, despite its widely recognized technological edge. It lost out to Matsushita's VHS, in part because its onerous licensing terms alienated the Hollywood studios.

Then in the 1990s, Toshiba outmaneuvered Sony to establish the standard for today's DVDs. The Japanese company teamed up with Time Warner (TWX ) on the technology, using the media giant's clout to get other Hollywood studios on board. The result is that Toshiba and Time Warner rake in the lion's share of the royalties generated by DVDs. No one has disclosed precisely what those royalties are, but they run into the hundreds of millions of dollars.

Toshiba looked as if it could win the battle for high-definition DVDs too. After Sony and partners Philips and Matsushita (MC ) began work on Blu-ray, Toshiba in 2003 hired former Warner Bros. video chief Warren Lieberfarb to lobby for studio support. It was a savvy move, since it was Lieberfarb who had won the studios backing for the first DVD standard. By November, 2004, the assault appeared to be working—with Warner, Paramount, Universal, and New Line Cinema seemingly firmly in the Toshiba camp.

MICROSOFT'S CHOICES.  With so much at stake, Sony went on its own recruiting campaign. It quickly signed up some of the biggest names in consumer electronics, including Samsung and Sharp. By early 2005, Dell, HP, and Apple (AAPL ) Computer joined the industry standards group. The electronics makers think Blu-ray has the greatest chance to prompt consumers to start opening their checkbooks for new gear.

Microsoft at first stayed out of this tug-of-war. Instead, it focused on selling its software to both sides. The Toshiba camp first agreed to use a piece of Microsoft software, its VC-1 code, that squeezes content onto the disk, then decodes it for viewing. Then, in September, 2004, the Blu-ray backers adopted this chunk of code as well -- in exchange for a public pledge of neutrality from Microsoft. "We wanted them to join us," says an insider who is close to the Blu-ray Disc Assn. "But we compromised on neutrality."

That neutrality has unraveled over the past year, as Microsoft increasingly came to see Blu-ray as a risk to its fortunes. In May, Sony confirmed that it would include Blu-ray in the new PlayStation game console beginning next year. Microsoft's Xbox wouldn't have such capability. Then on June 15, the Blu-ray camp decided against using Microsoft's IHD technology to add interactive features to Blu-ray disks, opting instead to stick with software based on Java technology.

FIGHTING PIRATES.  In July, Sony decided to refine the Blu-ray standard in a way that would have far-reaching implications for Microsoft. Sony wanted to win the support of Twentieth Century Fox Film Studios, long Hollywood's leading advocate for tough anti-piracy measures. So Sony agreed to add safeguards developed for Fox by San Francisco's Cryptography Research, which could prevent Blu-ray movies from being ripped to a computer's hard drive.

Fox execs say their decision became a no-brainer, because of the extra protection and because as many as 30 million PlayStations might be sold in the next three years. "They have a Trojan Horse that will play a critical role in igniting the market for this product, and when they do, we intend to be in that market with them," says Michael Dunn, president of Fox Home Entertainment.

The move was a serious blow for Microsoft's Xbox. The company had decided to hold down costs by not including a next-generation DVD player in the game console. Instead, it planned to stream high-definition content from a PC sitting in one room to the console, which would be attached to a television. But Cryptography's safeguards meant studios could block their content from being taken off the DVD. That was the reason for Gates's exchange with Stringer at the conference. Gates wanted Sony to drop such technology, but Stringer wouldn't budge.

Andy Parsons, a Blu-ray spokesman, says the Cryptography technology does not block content from being moved around a network, but the association has yet to finalize details of whether it will allow for managed copying of the disk as Microsoft demands.

Meanwhile, Sony's camp received help winning over one influential studio from an unlikely source. Raider Carl C. Icahn, one of Time Warner's largest shareholders, began pressuring the studio to find ways to boost its stock price earlier this year. Despite Time Warner's long alliance with Toshiba, CEO Richard Parsons asked Jeff Bewkes, chairman of the company's entertainment unit, to reconsider the best way to recharge DVD sales. Bewkes decided that the studio should forget appearances and back Blu-ray if it was the format most likely to win consumers' hearts. "Blu-ray's potential for more capacity started looking better and better," said one Hollywood executive.

CRISIS MODE.  Once warner started to waver, Paramount Pictures decided to move first in order to negotiate better terms, according to Hollywood insiders. On Sept. 23 one Blu-ray insider saw preliminary contracts written up by Warner Bros. and Paramount to join the Blu-ray board. "It was all going to happen in a day or two," says the source.

Leaked to Microsoft, the news put the company in crisis mode. Execs began working the phones, lobbying retailers about the potential for mass consumer confusion if competing standards came to market. Concerned, CEO H. Lee Scott of Wal-Mart Stores (WMT ). personally telephoned Stringer and Walt Disney CEO Robert Iger, two Hollywood sources say. Finally, Microsoft issued its joint statement with Intel. Microsoft declined any additional comment for this article.

The public attack may have backfired. One day after Microsoft talked up the importance of Toshiba's ability to hit the market first with its standard, Toshiba announced it would delay rolling out its own HD DVD players until after the holidays. Sony's Blu-ray-equipped PlayStations are scheduled to go on sale early next year, too. The same day, Yoshihide Fujii, Toshiba's corporate senior vice-president for digital media products, said the company remained open to creating a single format.

OLIVE BRANCHES?  Such a compromise would avoid the confusion of two technologies coming to market next year. A few components of Toshiba's technology, and possibly Microsoft's, could be incorporated into Blu-ray to make it easier for them to join Sony. While Sony may agree, it is taking steps to avoid any substantial delay in Blu-ray. Sources say the company is considering reducing its royalty take and may underwrite the production costs of Blu-ray disks.

It may not be the Sony of old. But a Blu-ray victory would help the company regain a starring role in living rooms everywhere.

平民造就明星

------谈“超级女生”与“中国价值”相同和不同之处

 

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美名源   http://spaces.msn.com/members/bestname

 

“超级女生”取得如此巨大成功超出了所有人的想象，无论从经济效益和社会影响力角度分析，“超级女生”这样一次平民造星活动都取得了巨大的成功。也引发了各界热烈关注和讨论。今天鄙人就“超级女生”商业活动策划思路与中国价值发展思路谈些看法，也许对中国价值发展能够产生一些有意启发。

 

“超级女生”商业活动之所有成功主要有两点值得借鉴：第一点也是最重要的策划思路，就是让平名百姓成为歌唱明星，帮助普通人实现明星的梦想。这样就可以动员全国的平民百姓报名参加和支持这项商业活动。 第二利用所有的通讯和传播技术，制定细致实施战略战术让所有的参与者获得利益。这是美好策划思路保证。 其中有些细节值得关注如无任何限制的报名条件； 短信投票具体设计； 各地评选的组织； 选手与大众的互动方式；  湖南媒体与全国媒体的配合等等。每个环节的设计和执行都非常成功。 因此这次的“超级女生”受众参与程度和媒体报道远远超过了中央电视台的“梦想中国”。

 

平民成为明星本来是很自然事情，因为所有的明星都来自于平民，无论是谁无论是什么行业。 毛泽东也是从一个平民成为全球的政治明星；比尔盖次也是从一个平民变成了世界首富； 更不用说那些歌星各个来自平民百姓。 但是由于几千年的社会腐朽世俗观念始终存在世界各国，特别是在亚洲和非洲国家。 一批先期成功的阶层害怕被新人替代，总是利用一切手段来排挤和压制平民百姓的崛起和新人的出现。   因此平民要成功要崛起变得非常困难。

 

然而进入21世纪因为技术的进步和经济的开放，政治和经济和社会观念受到了新冲击和变化，平民可以拥有同样的社会资源，平民成为明星变得更加容易和简单。 互联网产业就是最好的例证。在中国就有张朝阳、丁磊、马化腾、等人从平民变成了世界级富豪。中国的平民变成著名歌星和影星更是不计其数。 因此在今天信息时代平民成为明星，成为富豪已经一个潮流。当然每个平民成就明星和富豪必须经历艰苦的过程。

 

中国价值有一点是与“超级女生”相同的那就是让一批平民和白领成为经济和社会的专家名人。 并且让所有支持参与中国价值建设的人们成为富裕阶层。 这是中国价值网站最重要的卖点，也是最重要的动力。

 

然而与“超级女生”不同的是：

1．  行业不同，主题内容不同。超级女生是一次性商业活动，中国价值是要打造一个媒体平台，因此难度远远大于超级女生。

2．  湖南卫视有现成的有实力的平台，中国价值要从头开始，从零开始，难度更大。

3．  超级女生的参加者理论上可以是10亿中国人，中国价值的参加者需要有一定的思想和文化要求。但是实际上只要对经济方面有独特思考和写作能力人都可以加入，因此理论上讲全国人数也将上千万，而可以阅读的人数更是上亿人。

4．  内容服务对象不同，超级女生的服务对象所有中国人，中国价值是关注中国经济发展的企业、官员、职业经理人。

 

因此中国价值要建设成为中国有影响力的经济媒体，让博客们成为专家名人，也可以从“超级女生”的运做手段中吸取有意的经验。让我们共同去努力实现梦想的事业。

 

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What kinds of enterprise are best in the world?

 

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Bestname  http://spaces.msn.com/members/bestname

 

What kinds of enterprise are best in the world?  Enterprises listed in Forbes500 and fortune500 are best?  Yes.  Some of them are best enterprises.

 

Today we usually use sales income and total capital to estimate enterprise’s value. It is hard to calculate the value of market influence force and innovation force.  Most of time we cannot know real profit of many enterprises due to false finance accounts.  Today some enterprises are listed in fortune500, tomorrow they will go bankrupt probably.

 

In our opinion Best Enterprise have not only largest sales incomes, but also should have some conditions below.

 

1.       Best Enterprises should have strong ability to win the competition in difficult and low market environment.

As we know Swiss Watch Manufactures had to disappear hardly in the world facing Japanese watch’s competition before. At last Swiss Watch Manufactures win the competition, they create great ideas and products for global customers. Their wonderful designing win people’s heart.

The second example Apple computer invent Internet music store and I-pod at most difficult time, I-pod and music store save Apple and create new and great Apple again.

 

2.       Best Enterprises should have long term of excellent capability of innovation.

Today Microsoft and Intel listed ahead of Fortune500 because they have leading capability of technology innovation. Google rush out of tough competition in IT industry within only several years because it has astonishing innovation of technology and management.

 

Today is knowledge age and information era. Everything has changes promptly. Any enterprises cannot keep their leading position if they only depend on their advantages of finance and large scales.

 

We believe there are more and more new enterprises which will grow up and win the competitions facing old giants in the world everyday.

 

Our Foresight Marketing Consultant can supply you creative strategy on marketing and management for global enterprises.

 

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Foresight89@yahoo.com.cn

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什么样的企业才是全球最优秀的企业？

 

先见策划 http://spaces.msn.com/members/foresight,

美名源  http://sapces.msn.com/members/ibizmen,

 

什么样的企业才是全球最优秀的企业？ 财富杂志500大企业是最优秀的吗？ 是。 其中有一部分是最优秀的。

 

今天我们往往还是用销售收入和资产来评价一个企业的价值。 可是我们很难去判断一个企业的市场影响力和企业创造力。许多时候我们甚至无法判断企业的真实利润，因为我们看到的是虚假财务报表。 常常我们还会看到今天被列在财富500大企业，明天因一个突发事件而倒塌了。

 

我们认为最优秀企业不仅要拥有最大的销售收入，而且要具备一下一些条件：

 

1．  最优秀企业必须有足够的能力在市场最困难和低迷的时刻去赢得市场胜利。

我们清楚记得瑞士整个钟表行业曾经面对日本手表产品的竞争几乎到了全军覆没的地步，最后瑞士人靠自己的智慧和方面创造了全新的时装手表SWATCH， 不仅赢回全球市场，还拯救了瑞士手表工业，同时还为世界创造了全新思维概念的手表。

还有一个经典案例就是苹果电脑，当苹果电脑走向低谷的时候，乔布斯重新回到苹果公司，领导苹果发明了苹果网上音乐商店和I-pod随身听。又一次开创了全球电子音乐新潮流。让苹果电脑换发了青春。

 

2．  最优秀的企业必须拥有长期的杰出的创新能力。

微软和英特尔始终排在财富500大前列不是因为他们的资金实力，而是因为他们有长期的技术创新能力。

Google能够在IT行业竞争对手们尾追堵截中崛起，是因为他们拥有杰出的技术和管理的创新能力。

 

今天已经是一个知识和信息时代，任何企业想依靠资金和规模横行市场是完全不可能的。因为今天每时每刻一切都会发生意想不到的变化。 一个两三个人的网络企业，三五年之内成为几十亿美圆资产的企业过去能够想象吗？ 现在这种故事NASDAQ市场每天都可以上演。

 

我们相信越来越的多新的企业将崛起，并且成功战胜全球老牌巨头企业。

 

我们先见策划愿意为全球企业成为最优秀企业提供战略战术上服务。

 

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2005年8月22日星期一

 

 

 

 

 

阿里巴巴的竞争对手们该怎么办？

 

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昨天阿里巴巴和雅虎共同召开了新闻发布会，对外正式宣布了阿里巴巴全面收购雅虎中国的新闻。这个发布会代表了一家全新的中国最大规模的互联网企业的诞生，同时也代表了中国互联网产业一轮全新的更加激烈的市场竞争的开始。 我们为中国有可能产生一家新的世界级互联网企业巨头而高心，我们也为中国互联网产业即将爆发的惨烈竞争而担忧。

 

从8月11日开始面对阿里巴巴的不仅仅是幸运和荣耀，更多的是层出不穷的挑战和问题。 两家完全不同企业类型和文化的企业如何整合？ 如此多元的业务如何开展？  强大的竞争对手如何去战胜？等等。 然而从马云的个性和阿里巴巴过去商业成功的经历分析，马云团队一定会抓紧每分每秒的时间，用他们特有的大胆和狂妄，以及细心和诡秘向阿里巴巴的重要对手发起猛烈的进攻和挑战。  如果在未来的一到二年之内他们能够克服困难，取得市场的主动地位，竞争对手们将很难有立足之地。

 

对于阿里巴巴的竞争对手们8月11日同样是一场全新的惨烈的市场竞争的开始。虽然目前竞争对手们都在互联网业务领域有一定的优势和地位，也都有雄厚的资金实力。 但是阿里巴巴加上雅虎将彻底改变中国互联网的格局，可能带来更多全新的商业模式。 目前暂时领先的门户网和搜索引擎企业千万要重视这个新诞生的阿里雅虎庞然大物， 决不可掉以轻心。 很高心注意到了搜狐网和新浪网对这次阿里的收购合并进行了热烈的讨论和报道，从一些深度的讨论分析中可以预见到未来市场发展的许多问题。 可惜的是目前的讨论分析只针对阿里巴巴收购雅虎中国对阿里巴巴是否有利和不利上面，对中国互联网产业市场竞争形势变化探讨太少，更没有讨论对互联网企业自身的影响。

 

面对中国互联网产业出现的新巨头，我们先见策划在此探讨一下不同的竞争对手们该怎么办？

 

1．  搜索引擎企业该怎么办？

马云在新闻发布会上重点强调了要加大搜索引擎的发展力度。阿里巴巴拥有了雅虎的搜索引擎3721和一搜，从理论上讲如同电子商务按上的翅膀，如果这个搜索翅膀设计巧妙安装到位，电子商务就有可能再次飞跃发展起来。道理很简单阿里巴巴和淘宝的用户全部是中小企业，中小企业是最需要搜索推广的。

百度和Google都是雅虎搜索最重要的竞争对手，面临的挑战最大。

百度目前暂时处于搜索市场领先地位，刚刚从NASDAQ融来巨额资金，马上将就要面对两个强大的竞争对手新阿里和Google，市场前景并不乐观。怎么办？

首先百度应该忘掉NASDAQ幸喜和荣耀，枪夺时间主动权，在阿里和雅虎的组合调整阶段推出更加有效策略冲击市场。当然这种先声夺人的战略和战术是否有针对性？是否有冲击力？是否有吸引力都是非常关键的。

Google已经正式启动了中国市场的攻略，委托三家代理拓展中国市场。原来Google主要针对百度，现在又要面对新阿里，因此市场策略可能需要新的调整。 Google委托代理是正确的策略，但是Google直接面对中国市场的代理和最终用户是新的尝试，可能会遇到许多问题，如何能够及时发现、协调平衡和调整中国市场的问题对Google是重大的考验。Google拥有强大的品牌和技术以及创新优势，如何扬长避短非常重要。

搜虎和新浪搜索引擎也将面临新的挑战。虽然他们两家目前市场分额不大，不是主要竞争对手，但是他们目前搜索用户对两家来说都非常重要，如果用户倒戈到其他搜索引擎，他们将彻底失去机会。

据报道MSN搜索引擎将在三个月后登陆中国市场，面对目前新的局面，MSN搜索引擎将采取何种战略战术需要创造性思想方法。

 

2．  电子商务BtoC和CtoC企业怎么办？

淘宝可能会合并一拍，这样ebay中国是淘宝CtoC市场C唯一对手。ebay中国虽然有强大的品牌实力和技术优势，但是严重缺乏精通中国市场的人才。ebay中国将面临生死存亡的考验。如果ebay中国不在本地人才上和本地营销战略上有重大突破，必然输多赢少，机会很小。

       然而CtoC还可能与BtoC市场的网上商店发生激烈争夺，这是新一轮网上商店崛起飞跃机会。鹬蚌相争，鱼翁得利。当然BtoC的网上商店如何取胜只有根据自身特长各施绝招。

 

3．  BtoB电子商务企业怎么办？

虽然阿里巴巴网站目前在BtoB市场具有一定的垄断地位，但是如果阿里巴巴团队力量分散，其他电子商务网站仍然有崛起的机会。如慧聪和环球资源。 还有许多专业的BtoB网站同样拥有巨大的机会。当然新的战略战术调整非常重要。

 

4．  门户网市场企业怎么办？

从马云新闻发布会发言看雅虎中国门户网内容建设可能不是他的重点，但是雅虎放弃中国的门户将是一种重大的失败，不太可能。没有优秀的门户对于雅虎其他业务的发展也不利。

因此对新浪和搜弧以新闻信息内容为主的门户网来说，如何抓住今年的时间机会，对门户内容建设和服务特色上进行许多重大的突破非常重要。

网易现在赢利重点已经转向网络游戏，从财务报表看网络游戏经营也基本成熟，因此有资金和时间对门户网进行战略性调整。

Tom虽然在户外广告取得可喜的发展，但是几年来门户网的建设却令人失望。Tom拥有和记黄浦和长江实业如此优秀的资金和渠道资源，如果门户网市场竞争失败将是非常可惜的。

中华网是门户网中品牌、内容、资金最弱的企业，是继续独立发展还是与其他企业合作？

还有许多国内新闻媒体的门户网也在迅速崛起，如新华网，中国新闻网，中央电视台网等等。其他专业媒体网站有很大的新闻媒体优势，在今天全球门户网战略调整的时机，如果战略战术正确，完全有可能成为雅虎和MSN那样的全球性门户网。

 

5．  即时通讯企业怎么办？

即时通讯是电子商务的重要手段，因此新阿里如果不重视雅虎通将是一种战略失败。

目前QQ虽然拥有领先的市场分额，但是这种分额正在缩小。MSN已经加大了市场拓展，并且取得了市场第二位，Popo也已经崛起，UC有自己的用户优势，Skype也是一个强劲对手。因此即时通讯工具将进入群雄争霸的年代。

对QQ而言将是打击最大的，因为是靠即时通讯用户为市场发展基础，其他竞争对手只是补充工具而易，因此QQ必须寻找新的突破和出路。不然将失去一切。

 

以上只是我们先见策划对新阿里巴巴网站成立以后的市场的粗略分析评论和建议。不久我们将对未来中国的搜索引擎市场、门户网市场、电子商务市场、即时通讯市场推出详细的市场营销战略分析和建议。希望能够为目前在中国发展的互联网企业们提供创造性的战略咨询服务。

 

预祝合作共赢，共同发展。

 

先见策划  http://spaces.msn.com/members/foresight,

网商 http://spaces.msn.com/members/ibizmen,

foresight89@yahoo.com.cn,

foresight89@hotmail.com,

qq:251955360

2005年8月12日

 

 

 

中国家电企业如何应对供过于求的国内市场？

 

先见策划 http://spaces.msn.com/members/foresight,

 

最近几年中国的家电企业都已深刻感受到了家电产品在全国各大中城市市场基本达到了饱和状态，产品销售数量很难突破，而利润却在不断下降。有许多产品由于原材料成本的快速增长已经处于严重亏本的地步。 另外由于中国与欧美贸易磨擦日益加剧，出口也受到了阻力。

 

其实这表明中国过去粗放发展模式走到了尽头。 由于过去二十年来我们企业长期无偿和低价开采和使用自然资源，造成了各种资源的巨大浪费。企业对资源进行大量浪费甚至破坏，原本可以长久使用的原材料资源变成了稀缺资源，变成了需要高难度开采的商品材料。 因此原材料价格高歌猛进成为必然。现在中国企业不得不一方面是原材料高涨， 另外一方面面对市场供过于求局面，自然企业就会出现亏损。

 

中国经济发展方式和结构的变革是顺应社会和环境以及市场发展趋势变化，自然企业也应当顺应这种变化。 然而由于市场和环境变化速度超出了企业管理层的预料，因此绝大多数企业并没有做好相应的准备，怎么办？

 

中国家电企业曾经在国内市场成功打败以日本家电企业为主的跨国企业巨头，曾经为中国人争得了荣誉，那么我们家电企业今天就不能再赢得一个更大的胜利吗？

 

中国家电企业出现目前的市场出路问题关键不是市场变的太快，而是企业管理层思想出了问题。由于中国大部分企业近二十年来满足于用产品加工和生产来实现企业的赢利和发展，没有将企业从加工生产和制造水平提高到自主创新和创造的水平。 虽然宣传上一直强调创新，但是实际上并没有引起足够的重视。 因此当市场产品一旦过剩以后，根本没有新的独特产品可以更新和替代。

 

产品和技术的创新确实需要资金投入，但是家电产品不同国防科技产品，并不需要巨资，更重要的是需要思想和人才。 今天我们中国家电企业早就拥有足够的资金去挖掘人才，为什么不重视呢？

 

我们先见策划预测未来三到五年是市场结构大调整时期，是市场重新布局的时期。中国家电企业有许多先天的优势，如果能够扬长避短，仍然有许多机会再创辉煌。

 

当然产品和技术创新和创造是未来竞争的主旋律，创新和创造需要大批优秀的人才和思路，需要时间积累，但是如果我们可以从国内外企业的经验中吸取足够知识，我们仍然可以找到更加有效的超越对手的方法和策略。我们先见策划可以提供有效战略思想。

 

先见策划

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2005年8月3日星期三

 

 

Is it Time to Shift Strategy?

July 11, 2005

From HBS workingknowlege   http://spaces.msn.com/members/foresight,

The best companies at weathering fundamental industry upheaval are those that spot and act on early warning signs, says this article from Strategy & Innovation.

by Scott D. Anthony

Larry Ellison, the CEO of Oracle, the Redwood Shores, California-based enterprise software giant, stunned Silicon Valley in 2003 by launching a hostile takeover bid for rival PeopleSoft. Many business analysts consider hostile takeovers to be a tool wielded by mature, old-world industries—a last-resort effort hardly worth contemplating in an innovative, nimble, high-growth industry such as software, in which alliances and pure competition are more the norm.

But Ellison correctly realized that the situation within his industry had fundamentally changed, that the circumstances on the software playing field were beginning to signal a dawning maturity, and that those impending events demanded a commensurate shift in Oracle's strategy. Whether Ellison can manage the shift successfully remains to be seen, but by finally nabbing PeopleSoft in December 2004, he at least has one key piece of the puzzle.

Although analysts and investors remain mixed in their verdict on Ellison's approach, if anything, Oracle should be faulted for waiting too long to shift its strategy; chinks in the company's armor began appearing several years ago as its growth slowed and disruptive attackers emerged, establishing footholds in adjacent markets.

Anticipating the need to make bold strategic shifts is one of the most pressing tasks facing CEOs and investors. And missing the appropriate window for an effective strategic shift can be dire: A generation ago, Digital Equipment Corporation—then a leader in the minicomputer business—missed the personal computer era, fell into decline, and was acquired by Compaq in 1998. Currently, telecommunications giants such as Verizon are trying desperately to ensure they don't miss similar shifts toward new technologies such as wireless data and voice over Internet protocol (VoIP).

Managing this transition requires solving a two-part equation. First, a company must spot the early warning signals from the market that indicate it needs to shift strategies. Second, it must react appropriately to those signals. Companies that accomplish this can weather industry transitions while creating strong competitive advantages. Similarly, individuals who can discern which companies in their investment portfolios understand this and which do not can manage their assets more prudently.

Spotting the need to shift strategies
Conclusive, concrete evidence pointing to the need for a strategy shift rarely arrives early enough for the information to be acted on effectively. Why is that? Too often, the data and evidence trickling into a market reflects what has already happened or, sometimes, what occurred in the distant past. Market-share reports, for example, typically provide insight into a series of decisions reached years earlier, meaning they contribute precious little guidance into the choices being made today, decisions that will end up shaping future market-share reports.

Therefore, companies need to take action before the signs are readily apparent, when faint signals are just a glimmer in and around their market. Specifically, companies should pay close attention to three things: a looming growth gap, signs of overshooting, and the emergence of disruption in adjacent markets.

Sign 1: A looming growth gap.
At its simplest, a growth gap is a chasm between where a company is actually headed and where that company would like to go. To best visualize a growth gap, imagine you are a strategic planner in a large corporation. Take your current businesses and the new products or services you have in your development pipeline. Project the revenues and profits that you can reasonably expect to get from those businesses three, five, and ten years into the future. Now, look at your company's strategic targets. Is there a gap between the targets and the projections?

One large consumer products company that conducted this analysis was shocked by the results. Even in its most optimistic scenarios, the company had to come up with almost $1 billion in new growth to meet its ten-year strategic plan. Whenever this kind of analysis results in a chart that resembles a large bar consisting of unspecified "new-growth businesses," start thinking about a strategic shift.

The good news for the consumer products company was that its pipeline would provide adequate performance over the next three years, giving the business ample runway to begin considering alternative paths to growth.

Of course, doing this analysis is easy when you're inside a company and have full access to product plans, projections, and other forms of detailed financial information. The task is infinitely more difficult for an outsider.

Conclusive, concrete evidence pointing to the need for a strategy shift rarely arrives early enough for the information to be acted on effectively. Why is that?

One way to begin is to see what growth rate is built into a company's stock price. To do this, look at the multiple of the current stock price attached to the company's most recent earnings (commonly called a price/earnings ratio, or P/E, and easily available at financial Web sites such as MarketWatch.com). The higher the multiple, the greater the growth rate the market attributes to the company. For instance, a high-growth company such as Google can have P/E ratios above 130, while low-growth companies such as General Motors have P/E ratios in the single digits.

With these numbers in hand, make your own assessment of whether it is reasonable to assume that the company's current product portfolio can carry it to where it needs to go. (This is especially powerful when combined with the following two signals discussed below.)

Watch carefully for changes in the rate of revenue growth as well. A decrease in the rate of growth can presage a looming growth gap. Oracle's experience provides a good example. The company's revenues grew at a compound annual rate of more than 30 percent between 1995 and 1999. Then, in 2000, its annual growth rate dipped to 15 percent. Although that rate is still relatively robust, the slowdown was a leading indicator of a shift in the marketplace. Oracle's growth dropped again to 7 percent the following year, after which sales declined for two years. Revenues in its most recently completed fiscal year, 2004, have finally returned to 2000 levels.

There are also more sophisticated ways to identify a gap between what a company has and what it needs. Chapter 1 of The Innovator's Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth, by Clayton M. Christensen and Michael E. Raynor (Harvard Business School Press, 2003), describes a methodology used by a company called HOLT Value Associates (now part of Credit Suisse First Boston) that measures the percent of a company's stock price accounted for by new growth businesses. For example, only 40 percent of General Electric's market capitalization in August 2002 came from existing businesses. (HOLT's analysis does not include in-development new products, only the expected returns as existing businesses slowly wind down over time.)

Sign 2: Overshooting is setting in.
The second indicator that a strategy shift is in order is signs that a company has overshot ever larger segments of its core business. This is often a root cause of industry change, since companies can innovate much faster than people can transition to benefit from those innovations. So companies ultimately give customers products and services whose performance is just too good (and whose price tag is too expensive) for the problems customers are trying to solve.

There are numerous signs that overshooting has occurred. Particular ones to watch for are:

• The market greeting a feature or improvement that a company worked on for years with a collective yawn.
• The company's sales force complaining to headquarters that "customers are just beating us up on price."
• The company ceding an "undesirable" market to a low-cost competitor.
• Declining prices or gross margins in a given market tier.

Such signals indicate one thing: Customers aren't valuing an industry's innovations the way they once did.

Conducting an analysis of whether a company has entered overshot terrain can be difficult because it is tough to secure definitive information showing that overshooting has set in. Typically, companies will find that the signals are mixed, so that interpretation requires management's judgment and intuition.

Given such ambiguity, the goal should always be to spot overarching trends and to look for a preponderance of evidence. Zero in on a specific market tier or group of customers to help bring the analysis into sharper focus. Finally, look at the problem from a variety of angles. Specific analyses that companies can run include:

• Analyzing market data to see if prices or margins in a given segment are trending down or whether companies are able to maintain price premiums for new products.
• Constructing substitution curves to measure the pace with which competitors with relatively cheap, simple solutions are gaining traction.
• Interviewing customers to see the dimensions along which they no longer need performance enhancements.
• Reading product reviews in industry journals to watch for indications that previously important features are growing increasingly irrelevant.

In Oracle's case, signs of overshooting had been apparent for years. Burned by the expense and difficulty of large-scale upgrades at a time when economic indicators wouldn't support those improvements, companies were growing increasingly unwilling to upgrade their software, stretching their existing products to last as long as possible. Some customers had even turned to simple, cheap solutions offered by companies such as San Francisco-based Salesforce.com.

Sign 3: Disruption taking root.
The third sign that a company might need to shift its strategy is when a business takes root with a disruptive strategy that could prove to be a future threat. Disruptive attackers often seem inoffensive at first, since they make their name by providing relatively simple, low-priced, convenient alternatives that are not good enough for the bulk of the market but are good enough for customers in the low end or entirely new markets. As those disruptive attackers grow and improve, however, they often emerge as serious competitive threats.

Once again, Oracle's recent experience provides a good example: In its case there clearly were (and are) disruptive players swirling around its market. For example, MySQL (Uppsala, Sweden) has established a base in a new market with its Linux-based database product. Although MySQL's product can't do everything that Oracle's product can, its flexibility and low price has made it very attractive for Web applications such as Web logs and financial Web sites. MySQL is still too small to have a meaningful impact on Oracle, but it has established a foothold from which it can grow to become a legitimate threat to Oracle.

Perhaps the biggest hazard in trying to spot disruptive developments is that disruptive companies that create new markets can grow for a long time before they materially affect existing companies. So looking at traditional data such as industry growth rates and market-share reports can lull incumbent companies into a false sense of complacency.

Consider the way mobile telephones disrupted the landline telephone. For about 25 years, the minutes of use for mobile calls had no impact on the minutes of use for landline calls. People made mobile calls in contexts where no landline phone was available. Today, however, customers are beginning to cut the landline cord, using their stationary phone significantly less often.

The search for disruption, therefore, has to be broadly conducted. For example, Microsoft recognized years ago that handheld devices such as the cell phone and the Palm Pilot and gaming systems such as the Sony PlayStation could eventually disrupt the personal computer. That would be devastating, Microsoft reasoned, for a company whose primary source of revenue came from selling the operating system that powers almost all personal computers.

So Microsoft set out to become a player in the handheld device market (through its Windows CE operating system) and in the gaming market (through its Xbox product). Though Microsoft has had difficulties gaining traction in both markets, identifying long-term disruptive threats and attempting to react proactively will always be in its strategic best interest.

Companies that need to pay particularly close attention to disruption are those that operate in markets where having particular skills, a degree of wealth, or access to a centralized setting limits consumption. Competitors with disruptive intentions will inevitably find a way to tackle one of those constraints, setting the framework for an entirely new market. Although it may take a while, you can predict that the company that has democratized a limited market will improve its solution to the point where it can materially affect existing—and even adjacent—providers.

Reacting to the signals
This article has, up to now, primarily used the software industry to illustrate all three of the signs discussed above. The telecommunications service provider market also manifests these signs. The core business for most telecommunications providers (such as Verizon and AT&T) is in inexorable decline, portending future growth gaps. Customers are demonstrating that they would rather have convenient adaptable solutions as they switch from highly reliable landlines to somewhat less reliable but infinitely more flexible mobile solutions. And disruptive companies such as Skype, Vonage, and Clearwire are emerging in multiple markets.

Recognizing the signs is not enough. Nor is it sufficient to spot the signs and respond aggressively. AT&T, long one of the most well regarded U.S. companies, identified the need to shift strategies more than twenty years ago. As recounted in chapter 1 of The Innovator's Solution, AT&T's multiple efforts to create new growth platforms have all floundered. Similarly, Kodak identified the need to create a digital imaging platform in the late 1970s, but it took twenty years and a huge amount of investment before the company stumbled onto the right digital-imaging strategy.

Companies can chart one of three paths as they try to react to shifting signals:

1. Consolidate.
Companies can consolidate the industry by snatching up leading competitors and attempting to emerge as the dominant player in a dwindling marketplace. Citibank emerged as a banking powerhouse by following this strategy as companies used credit scoring techniques to hollow out the commercial banking industry. Ellison clearly intends for Oracle to follow this path as well.

It always is hard to grow to greatness by acquisition, but it is more prudent to play the game than to sit back and hope that the growth that existed in the past can be sustained in the future.

2. Create.
An alternative course is to begin creating new growth platforms. This is the approach Microsoft is trying as it attempts to kick-start its growth engine while the core business is still robust.

It is critically important that companies attempting to go down this path start to do so before it becomes a necessity. It is tough for new growth businesses to get very big very fast, so companies that start investing in this route only when the need is obvious oftentimes doom themselves to failure. In all likelihood, Microsoft probably started its efforts a bit too late, since it has had to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to play catch-up in established markets.

3. Acquire.
The third strategy borrows elements from the previous two strategies. It involves acquiring new growth platforms that are emerging and riding the resultant wave of growth. Johnson & Johnson's Medical Device and Diagnostics division famously did this throughout the 1990s, with several small acquisitions powering the growth of the entire division. Cisco Systems hopes its acquisition of low-cost networking provider Linksys in 2003 will prove similarly successful.

There are two components to getting this strategy right. First, companies need to make their strategic acquisition before the market recognizes the disruptive potential of the emerging growth company. Cisco had to pay only $500 million for Linksys. If it had waited until Linksys's disruptive potential was clear, the price tag would have been significantly higher.

Companies also need to ensure they avoid the temptation to integrate the new-growth platforms too tightly. Oftentimes, the very reason an acquisition looks tempting is because the company being acquired is different than the core organization in some meaningful way. Pushing for tight integration could destroy the very asset companies are seeking to obtain.

The cost of waiting
Most executives are loath to shift strategies unless they have conclusive proof that they have to. Their hesitation is understandable because changing directions and charting new trails is a daunting task. But the convincing proof executives desperately hope will confirm the necessity of a strategy change will materialize only after the industry shift has occurred and it is too late to initiate meaningful protective measures. After all, by the time the writing is on the wall, everyone else can read it, too.

Reproduced with permission from "Can You Spot the Early Warnings?" from Strategy and Innovation, Vol. 3, No. 2, March 2005.

See the current issue of Strategy and Innovation.

Scott D. Anthony is a partner at Innosight. He can be reached at innovation@hbsp.harvard.edu.

 

 

如果在国内无法战胜国际品牌去国外怎么可能成功？

 

先见预测 http://spaces.msn.com/members/foresight

 

近年来中国许多企业有一种冲动，到欧美发达国家投资和收购的冲动。中国企业走出国门走向世界本身是一件好事。许多中国企业有了最近二十年的积累，有一定资金实力可以投资和收购了。 然而我们看到更多的企业是因为自己的产品在中国市场发展发生了困难，而考虑走出国门去发展。许多企业雄心勃勃把目标瞄准了欧美发达国家市场，这种发展战略能够成功吗？

 

在经济全球化的今天，中国国内市场早已成为了全球市场。中国企业在国内面对的市场竞争不只是中国企业之间的竞争而是全球企业之间的竞争。中国产品虽然在价格上有一定优势，但是在品牌和创新方面却远远落后与全球跨国企业。

 

虽然中国制造生产产品已经成功销往世界各国， 但是中国制造产品大部分还停留在低价竞争阶段，而且这种低价的利润和主动权基本上掌握的跨国企业手上。

 

中国企业在国内拥有天时地利人和优势地位，如果在这种条件下中国的企业无法从品牌上，从技术和产品创新上战胜全球跨国企业，走出国门怎么可能成功呢？这是我们先见策划真诚的提醒。

 

先见策划

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投资沃尔玛

http://biz.163.com　2005-05-10 10:57:53　来源: 中国企业家　　　网友评论 0 条 

 

    “投资沃尔玛”是否可行呢？

    事实上投资沃尔玛完全可行，而且有着比较现实的可行性。首先，沃尔玛的股东比较分散，前五大机构投资者股东的持股比例不超过10%.截至2005年3月17日，沃尔玛市值2269亿美元。按照这一数字简单计算，拥有沃尔玛10%股权的收购成本将不超过230亿美元。这对于拥有巨额外汇储备的中国而言实现的基础难度并不大；其次，美国资本市场比较发达，且企业基本是整体上市，通过股票市场公开购买股权并掌控其全部资源障碍较小。我们通过在股市直接购买就可以成为沃尔玛的一大股东。另外，沃尔玛是的业务模式非常清晰，也不存在巨额的研发投入，处于风险小，比较稳定成熟的行业，容易看透和参与管理。我们完全可以有效地行使股东的权利，监督管理团队，让老外在全球为我们打工。

    “投资沃尔玛”，看起来是个大胆的设想，但是其实新洋务战略所带来的思维方式的巨大突破是可以适用于很多领域的。原来想都不敢想，看起来遥不可及，听起来天方夜谭的事，在新的思维看来却是最需要的，最值得，也是最有能力做的。

    在全球视野下，我们的优势和薄弱环节以及解决之道完全不同。像投资沃尔玛这样的举措，如果要变成现实行动，就要有全球的资源为我所用的眼界和胸怀，要超越独立自主，自力更生，找出中国企业整体最需要解决的问题，投资全球最好的资源，借力打力。

    沃尔玛股权结构

    沃尔玛家族和管理层持股     40%

    机构和共同基金持股     36%

    前五大机构持股者

    股东          持股数量    %    市值（亿美元）

    巴克利银行   148808370   3.51    $78.6

    道富公司     107638594   2.54    $56.9

    富达基金     96835402    2.29    $51.1

    先锋集团     88086254    2.08    $46.5

    北方信托公司 47634829 1.12 $25.2

    截止日期：2004年12月31日

“三块板”与中国企业困境

    对中国企业的全球竞争力进行整体的分析，我们可以把面临的问题形象地比喻为 “三块板”：即核心技术层面的“天花板”、掌控全球性销售网络层面的“地板”以及发达国家反倾销策略的中间“隔板”。

    在全球产业竞争中，在“三块板”的挤压下，中国企业的生存空间越来越狭小。可以说，如果解决不了“三块板”的问题，中国企业必将从计划经济的鸟笼刚出来，又被关进市场经济的鸟笼，中国出不了世界级的企业，中国经济很有可能被边缘化。在有限的时间和生存空间内，中国企业必须寻求全新的破解之道。

    解决中国企业面临的“三块板”问题，首先是视野的转变。中国企业家一定要认识到今天的全球化的时代必然要求中国企业家有全球视野，要超越“从中国看世界”，学会“从世界看中国，从月球看世界”，用全球性的资源来对抗全球竞争，而不是用中国的资源参与全球竞争。“新洋务战略”要求中国企业在全新的思维框架下看待我们面临的问题，给自己一个准确的定位，同时应当充分认识到全球视野和整合全球资源是成为世界级企业的必要条件。

    其次，我们一定要有全球的资源为我所用的眼界和胸怀，超越帝国保卫战以及独立自主，自力更生的传统思路，必须改变“内部瓜分资源”的内向思维方式，善于借力打力，尽快打造一批外向型的世界级企业群体，在世界范围内攻城拔寨。

    只有在这样的视野和前提下，我们才能找到准确的战略突破口。

    “投资沃尔玛”的巨大战略利益

    投资沃尔玛，由此解决地板的问题，实际就是这一新思维的一个应用。

    中国大量的企业，特别是中小企业面临着国际销售渠道狭窄的共同问题。靠每个企业单独去拓展，不仅成本巨大，而且周期很长。有没有更好的办法呢？从全球商品销售渠道来讲，最好的现成的渠道是——沃尔玛，我们是否可以借助沃尔玛的力量达到中国企业的目的呢？我认为完全可以，投资沃尔玛能给我们带来巨大的战略利益：第一，解决“地板”的问题。沃尔玛拥有全球最好的销售渠道，成为沃尔玛的股东可以很好的打通中国企业海外产品销售渠道，解决了大量中小企业面临的迫切问题。虽然我们不能绝对要求沃尔玛采购中国商品，但作为董事会的股东，我们至少可以影响沃尔玛的采购策略，使更多的中国主流产品进入欧美主流市场。

    第二，良好的投资收益。1994年至2004年的10年间，沃尔玛年股东平均回报率达到18.2%.作为全球最优秀的企业之一，沃尔玛拥有完善的治理结构和良好经营管理，我们可以由此理性预期分享沃尔玛带来的巨大收益。此外，从长期角度来看，沃尔玛的净资产回报率远远高于同期美国国债的投资收益率。投资沃尔玛不但本身有很好的价值，也可以改善我们单一外汇储备结构，规避风险。

    第三，我国面临着人民币升值的压力。一旦政府决策人民币升值，投资沃尔玛也可以使我们在相对便宜的价钱下得到最需要的战略资源，化不利为有利。

    第四，沃尔玛是最好的“商业雷达”。对于沃尔玛而言，全球通畅的产品销售渠道是其成功的重要条件，但是最佳的商品零售商的成功首先要做到的是了解全球客户需求，为消费者提供最佳的商品。这要求沃尔玛能够对遍布全球的企业有所了解与掌控，同时能够很好的判断商品发展趋势。通过对沃尔玛全球商品采购趋势的判断与分析，我们完全可以了解全球商业发展的某种趋势。由此可以很好的指导中国企业在全球竞争中把握自我。

    最后，形成你中有我，我中有你的不可分割的战略利益关系。作为处于相对弱势地位的中国企业来讲，能和世界级企业形成紧密的联盟无疑是非常有益的。而通过成为沃尔玛的股东，我们不但可以直接获得较为理想的投资收益与全球销售渠道，从更长远的角度看，我们还可以与沃尔玛形成更为紧密的战略合作伙伴关系，这种伙伴关系可以使中国企业与沃尔玛“一荣俱荣，一损俱损”。从而使双方在共同的目标下，有效的避免各种利益争执，努力争取在全球市场的更大收益。

Are You Ready to Fight a Giant?

From hbs working knowlodge,      http://spaces.msn.com/members/foresight,

July 25, 2005

Industry incumbents are surprisingly vulnerable, say two Bain consultants in this article from Strategy & Innovation. Any savvy upstart can successfully challenge a Goliath. For starters: Focus on a powerful customer experience.

by Chris Harrop and Barney Hamilton

The concept of "barriers to entry" is perhaps the most daunting proposition an innovator must face. Incumbent companies run by deep, experienced management teams dominate almost every industry. Established customer relationships, tried-and-true products, powerful brands, and significant scale advantages provide these companies with a thick armor that often appears impregnable to aspiring entrants.

Yet, time and again, upstarts find a way to prevail—and not only in technology hotbeds such as Silicon Valley. Nationwide, slow-growth industries with high fixed costs—including auto manufacturing, consumer goods, and big-box retailing—may seem unassailable. But then along come such giant slayers as Toyota, Nike, and Amazon.com, each of which has transformed the business landscape of its industry.

In truth, industry incumbents are often surprisingly vulnerable. Clayton Christensen and others have shown that beating an established company at its own game requires strategies that disrupt the status quo by focusing on customers the incumbents either ignore or aren't willing to defend.

Occasionally, companies can invent a better mousetrap and challenge an incumbent head-on for its most profitable customers. But most succeed by first devising cheaper, more convenient ways to serve targeted customer niches that are below an incumbent's radar. This allows the entrant to mine profits in ways that are not cost-effective for incumbent companies, which have higher cost structures and broader focus. Over time, that strategy can migrate to other segments until the challenger's approach becomes the new status quo.

But how do innovators create disruption? Bain's experience and analysis suggest that customer focus holds the key. Successful challengers target specific segments and design propositions that address customers' unique concerns in ways incumbents don't—and very often can't. (See the sidebar "Are You Ready to Take On a Giant?") Challengers deliver a powerful customer experience by coordinating efforts across business functions, and they punch above their weight by investing selectively in what matters most to their target segments. Then they succeed over the long haul by systematically renewing their edge with customers.

All customers are not created equal
Giant slayers begin by recognizing that customers' needs and perceptions of value vary significantly across segments. Incumbents tend to give their customer segments varying amounts of attention, frequently concentrating on those that deliver the highest margin. Successful challengers often begin with a single-minded focus on delivering superior propositions to overlooked segments—addressing needs or desires that established companies don't (or can't) meet.

Giant slayers begin by recognizing that customers' needs and perceptions of value vary significantly across segments.

The European airline industry's dramatic turnabout provides a stark example of how powerful customer focus can be. Before 1995, high-cost "legacy" carriers—such as British Airways, Lufthansa, and Air France—dominated. They tried to be all things to all travelers but, for obvious reasons, spent most of their energies catering to their most profitable customers: businesspeople.

This created a bloated cost structure that opened the door for Ryanair and easyJet, two start-ups founded on the premise that many customers simply want a convenient, inexpensive way to travel. Both companies created a focused value proposition for cost-sensitive leisure and private travelers and tailored their business plans to make that model work.

The strategy began with their fleets. To gain a cost advantage, the challengers bought small, efficient aircraft and offered only one class of service. Unlike the incumbents, they standardized their fleets, reaping savings from common maintenance and training programs. And rather than maintain expensive, inconvenient hub networks, they chose high-volume, point-to-point routes from less-crowded, secondary airports.

To save on distribution costs these airlines chose their sales channels carefully. They eschewed traditional third-party travel agents and pricey booking systems and relied on direct sales channels: telephone call centers and the Internet. As a result, distribution makes up only 3 percent of total costs at Ryanair, versus 10 percent for some large carriers. The smaller carriers pass those savings on to the customer.

Both upstarts recognized quickly that online transactions were their most profitable channel. So they worked hard to steer customers to their Web sites without sacrificing service quality or convenience. EasyJet offers a discount of £10 (approximately U.S. $18.50) per round trip if customers book over the Internet. Once on the easyJet site, customers find a simple-to-use interface that downloads quickly, even on dial-up modems. Buying a ticket requires only five steps, versus ten on some legacy carriers' sites. And because easyJet collects key customer data with each booking, it is able to analyze more precisely who its customers are in order to continually hone its strategy.

Without large bureaucracies and unions, Ryanair and easyJet also benefit from low overhead and cheap labor. They have driven cost out of their supply chains and ignored the bells and whistles their customers don't value, such as free in-flight food and drinks.

The lack of corporate baggage is a key advantage for any upstart.

Profits are plowed back into the business to continue to provide customers with a comfortable, lower-cost alternative, which in turn drives more volume. The results have been dramatic. Low-cost carriers have already taken 10 percent of the intra-Europe market and are projected to have more than 25 percent by 2010. Ryanair and easyJet together added more than £4 billion (nearly U.S. $7.5 billion) in market value between 1995 and 2003, while many large incumbent carriers have lost value.

Focus the business on delivering a powerful customer experience
The lack of corporate baggage is a key advantage for any upstart. While new entrants can design their business plans and strategies on a clean sheet of paper, older companies are saddled with systems and patterns of behavior developed over many years. This hampers their ability to deliver the sorts of end-to-end solutions challengers can devise from scratch.

A few years back, Australian telecommunications companies faced a tough growth environment after deregulation of the market led to intensified competition and price pressure. Number two player Optus Administration, which had been the first to take on the incumbent Telstra, was able to fill a good portion of its growth gap by taking a close look at key customer segments and coming up with distinctive services tailored to its customers' needs.

The flexibility to "design for purpose" led to a major promotion—called "'yes' Time"—in which Optus invited its customers to call each other for free between 8 p.m. and midnight. At the heart of the initiative was an innovative pricing strategy that used an asset that was of little expense to Optus—in this case, spare nighttime network capacity—to provide something of real value to its customers.

The promotion hit a bull's-eye, helping Optus to turn existing customers into brand promoters who encouraged friends and associates to switch to Optus's service. "'Yes' Time" was a winner on another level as well. It encouraged new and existing Optus mobile customers to use Optus at night instead of relying on Telstra's traditional landlines for their evening calls.

Optus has counted on its entrepreneurial culture to help it grow into the multibillion-dollar business it is today. For instance, in the mid-1990s it implemented a computer-sharing initiative that cut millions in IT costs and improved call-center productivity. Today the company uses innovative partnering programs, including one that pays commissions to businesses that help generate sales leads for Optus.

Viewing the marketplace through the eyes of a challenger taking on established players is "in the cultural DNA of the company," points out CEO Paul O'Sullivan in a recent interview with The Australian Financial Review. "It's not one of those top-down hierarchical corporations...This is a far more maverick…place. And we pride ourselves on that."

Building on its customer innovations and its cultural strengths, Optus has consistently grown at more than twice the rate of the market since the company started operations in 1992 and has taken market share from Australian incumbent telco Telstra. The company's revenue has grown to A$5.5 billion (U.S. $4.3 billion), up from about A$2 billion (U.S. $1.5 billion) in 2000, and it now enjoys market leadership in such customer segments as high-speed Internet access.

Renew the customer experience again and again
The ability to move quickly based on superior knowledge of customer needs is another hallmark of successful challengers. They often build tight feedback loops with their markets, taking full advantage of their flatter organizations to ensure that customer insights are identified and acted upon. This capability allows them to renew a valuable and satisfying customer experience again and again. It also gives them the ability to identify future customers and reorient their strategy to market changes.

Over the last decade, the home mortgage business in Australia has undergone a sea change brought about by upstart mortgage brokers (such as Mortgage Choice, Australian Finance Group, and Aussie Mortgage Market) and low-cost mortgage originators (such as Aussie Home Loans). As recently as 1993, traditional banks controlled all but a sliver of the mortgage market. But by listening carefully to what customers wanted and providing the increased service they sought, independent brokers forced the banks to play by a new set of rules.

By 2003, brokers were originating 30 percent of mortgages in Australia, and their share grew to around 45 percent by the end of 2004. More impressive, they have captured A$350 million of the Australian mortgage profit pool (U.S. $270 million). Concurrently, bank margins have been slipping steadily.

The independent brokers have tapped into a deep wellspring of home-buyer consternation. In a recent survey, Australian borrowers were asked if they found the mortgage process confusing: 75 percent of them said yes. A sizeable majority also preferred personal visits from mortgage brokers or even shopping for their mortgage on the Internet to visiting a bank branch for a loan. What they wanted was unbiased advice. And the brokers were providing it.

The ability to move quickly based on superior knowledge of customer needs is another hallmark of successful challengers.

Traditional lenders tend to push proprietary products with minimal focus on an individual's circumstances, but brokers can draw from an array of lenders for the best rates and payment terms. Moreover, brokers offer expert advice to individuals who are often novices at one of the most significant and complex transactions most consumers will ever make. Banks provide limited service and customers have to shop around on their own for the best terms. Brokers, on the other hand, offer one-stop shopping and often will make house calls or office visits to explain options. And brokers provide these extra services at no additional cost to borrowers. They are funded by the very banks they compete with, through a schedule of commissions.

Why do the banks put up with it? To date, they've had no choice. Although the brokers take profits away from the banks, they provide such a compelling service that the banks have been forced to support their efforts. But the banks are fighting back. They've reduced broker payments for poor-quality loans and aligned commissions to reward more profitable types of loans, such as those that have longer terms. Their interest rates and offerings have also grown more competitive.

All of this has cut into the brokers' margins and highlighted how essential it is for challengers to use superior customer knowledge to stay ahead of the curve. Unfortunately, the brokers have missed some tricks.

Instead of relying so heavily on bank commissions, brokers could have parlayed their customer relationships into products beyond financial-planning advice. That's what Optus and the European airlines have been able to do—take their original concept and migrate it into other segments. It isn't easy. Indeed, one of the leading Australian brokers, Wizard Home Loans, recently sold out to GE Money, the consumer finance arm of General Electric, in recognition that it needed help to compete. Wizard's experience is an object lesson: Finding ways to deliver customer satisfaction again and again is crucial to making giant slaying sustainable.

Learning from the giant slayers
That a David can defeat a Goliath is no myth. Even when upstart companies lack long-standing relationships, pervasive brands, and scale advantages, they can still win big against incumbents, driving dramatic market-share shifts in just a few years.

Reproduced with permission from "Lessons from the Giant Slayers," Strategy & Innovation, May-June 2005.

See other HBS Publishing newsletters.

Chris Harrop is a partner with Bain & Company in Sydney, and co-leader of Bain's telecom and technology practice in Asia.

Barney Hamilton is a Bain partner in London.

They can be reached at innovation@hbsp.harvard.edu.

 

 

 

海尔退出美泰克收购竞争是明智之举

 

先见策划 http://spaces.msn.com/members/foresight, http://davidusn.chinavalue.net,

 

由于美国惠尔浦的突然插入提价收购美泰克，海尔集团迅速决定退出收购，这是非常明智的战略决策。 与收购的价格和资金没有任何关系，因为以海尔集团在中国的名誉获得中国银行的资金支持轻而易举。

 

从开始得知海尔集团要收购美泰克时鄙人就反对海尔这次收购举动， 因为第一次以海尔目前的资金实力，花费如此巨资收购美泰克，背上12亿美圆的债务去冒险收购等于一次没有退路赌博。如果失败整个海尔集团就可能垮掉。   第二海尔完全有其他更有效更省钱的全球扩张和品牌提高的发展战略，为什么不尝试更好的战略方法。   第三美泰克并不是世界上最优秀的家电品牌，它只拥有了美国和加拿大的一些销售渠道优势，然而利用渠道还有许多其他的策略和方法。  因此海尔收购美泰克是一个重大的战略错误。

 

海尔完全有更加有效的策略和方法来提高海尔在全球的品牌号召力和影响力，从而大幅度提高海尔产品在国内和国际的销售能力。而这种全新和有效的战略只需要花费收购美泰克20%--30%的资金。  为什么海尔集团不去尝试呢？  海尔如果需要我们先见策划可以提供一套完整的策略方案。 如果无效分文不取。

 

中国企业最大优势是什么？是用较小的资金和较低的价格去赢得全球市场的胜利。  过去我们所有的产品都是采用低成本和低价格的策略走向了全球市场。 但是我们最大弱势是什么？ 就不尊重知识和不尊重人才的价值。  一个优秀的思想和绝妙的创意和发明往往被无偿的剽窃和低价的盗用， 因此中国制造企业的产品虽然早已走向的世界，但是无法摆脱廉价商品的命运。 由于这种不尊重知识产权和人才价值，倒过来又将千心万苦打拼出来的畅销产品变成无利可图的廉价品。

 

中国的名牌企业到底从麦当劳、可口可乐、耐克、苹果电脑等产品企业中学到了什么？ 我们先见策划愿意为中国企业创建全球优秀品牌提供创造性的思想和战略。

 

先见策划

http://spaces.msn.com/members/foresight

foresight89@yahoo.com.cn

 

2005年7月21日

 

 

Companies list in Fortune500 and Forbes500 are not strongest companies and only largest companies in the world.

 

Foresight---foresight create first chance  http://spaces.msn.com/members/foresight,

 

 

Companies list in Fortune500 and Forbe500 are not strongest companies in the world, they are only largest companies in the world.

 

Because Fortune and Forbes magazines appraise global companies mainly based on their revenues and capitals. Those companies listed in Fortune500 and Forbes500 only mean they are largest companies on revenue and income and capital, they are not the best company with competitive power. So they are not strongest companies in the world.

 

排名财富世界500和福布斯世界500的企业并不是世界500强的企业，而是世界500大的企业。

 

因为财富杂志和福布斯真正主要按照企业的收入和资产来评选世界500企业，因此评选出排名世界500的企业并不代表最有竞争能力的企业，也不代表世界最强的企业。他们是世界最大的企业。

 

Foresight

http://spaces.msn.com/members/foresight

 

July 19, 2005